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ABSTRACT 
The majority of literature written on the economic impact of border security has 
indicated that the increased security following 9/11 has had adverse effects on the flow of 
foreign imports. This study measures the direct cost the Homeland Security Advisory 
System (HSAS) had on U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) overtime spending 
and the indirect cost on the U.S. economy by reducing the daily flow of imports.  Three 
case studies were conducted at the United States’ largest ports of entry.  Each compared 
CBP overtime spending and the daily flow of imports during the seven periods the HSAS 
was elevated to ORANGE between 2002 and 2005.  The study found that increased threat 
levels of the HSAS resulted in 50% more overtime spending by CBP.  However, the 
HSAS had no impact on the daily flow of imports into the United States during the seven 
periods of elevated security between 2002 and 2005. 
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I. THE COST OF BORDER SECURITY  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 3 
established the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS).  The HSAS was 
established as a mechanism to inform government, the private sector, and American 
citizens of both the probability of an attack occurring and its potential gravity.1  An 
important point often debated is that increases in the threat level of the HSAS come with 
additional costs.  This paper will focus on the economic impact that elevations in the 
HSAS has on international trade and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). 
B. IMPORTANCE  
Economic trade between the United States and the world has rapidly increased 
during the past two decades.  The implementation of free trade agreements such as the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Dominican Republic-Central 
America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) has dramatically changed the dynamics of 
the U.S. manufacturing industry and consumer markets. While free trade has substantially 
increased productivity, the U.S. economy has become critically dependent on foreign 
trade and the rate at which it arrives from distant markets.  In the month of March 2008, 
more than $170 billion worth of imports traveled legally across the nation’s borders.2  
Foreign trade annually constitutes 25% of the U.S. Economy.  The current trends in 
foreign trade will likely continue to increase as the United States’ membership in free 
trade agreements and involvement in world markets both continue to grow. 
                                                 
1 Shawn Reese, Homeland Security Advisory System: Possible Issues for Congressional Oversight 
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Services, The Library of Congress, 2006), 1, 
http://bosun.nps.edu/uhtbin/hyperion-image.exe/CRS-RL32023.pdf (accessed May 28, 2008). 
2 Foreign Trade Division, U.S. Census Bureau, “Foreign Trade Statistics,” 
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top0803cm.html#imports (accessed June 2, 
2008). 
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The Homeland Security Advisory System plays a critical role in keeping 
Americans safe by allowing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to disseminate 
terrorist threat warnings quickly to federal, state, and local security agencies.  
Additionally, the HSAS affords DHS an effective tool for providing warnings to public 
and private sector entities.  While the HSAS has been successful in broadcasting changes 
in the threat level, its implementation has also adversely impacted the United States’ 
economy.  Between September 10, 2002 and August 12, 2005, the HSAS has been 
elevated from threat level YELLOW to ORANGE seven times for a total of 236 days.  
The total extent of the economic damage inflicted by increases in border security is 
extremely complex and has been debated by numerous studies.  However, it is agreed that 
slow downs in trade from additional security at our nation’s ports of entry can result in 
billions of dollars per day in additional costs and lost productivity.  In the days following 
the attacks of September 2001, industries that relied on just-in-time shipping to keep their 
production lines running were hit the hardest.  For example, the auto industry came to a 
stop the week after the 9/11 attacks as Ford and DaimlerChrysler closed six different U.S. 
manufacturing plants due to a lack of necessary components that were assembled in 
Canada.3 
The implementation of threat level ORANGE security procedures has an 
additional direct cost to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection organization.  Increased 
security translates into more frequent and more demanding searches of cargo and people 
passing across the U.S. borders.  The increase in workload under heightened conditions 
creates longer workdays for CBP personnel.  Under these surge operations, CBP must 
provide additional overtime payments to meet the required manning.   
The HSAS is a critical tool to warn the nation.  The increased reliance on foreign 
trade and a just-in-time supply chain make implementing the HSAS potentially hazardous 
to the U.S. economy.  Increased work levels during elevated security periods require 
more manpower and overtime pay.  These factors must be carefully considered in the 
decision to elevate the Homeland Security Advisory System.  
                                                 
3 Peter Andreas and Thomas J. Biersteker, The Rebordering of North America: Integration and 
Exclusion in a New Security Context (New York: London: Routledge, 2003), 115. 
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C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The general consensus from experts regarding the HSAS is that the heightened 
security level is necessary, but the system places significant costs directly on Customs 
and Border Protection and indirectly on the U.S. economy by limiting the flow of 
imports.  This study will determine what the direct cost to CBP is during increased threat 
levels, and show that the HSAS had little effect on restricting the flow of imports into the 
United States. 
Secondary economic impacts of the HSAS such as the airline industry, lost 
tourism, and retail business from cross-border shoppers are beyond the scope of this 
study.  Additionally, the impact the Homeland Security Advisory System has on foreign 
economies will not be addressed in this project. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A great deal of literature on the economics of border security has been written 
following the terrorist attacks of 2001.  Much of the focus has been targeted on the rise of 
security inspections on persons and goods entering through the United States’ more than 
300 ports of entry.  The range of the literature has varied from the economic impact of 
border delays to environmental and highway safety issues for foreign drivers. The most 
significant literature for this project can be broken down into three different areas:  1) 
transportation of Canadian exports into the United States,  2) transportation of Mexican 
exports into the United States, and 3) maritime container shipment.  While the studies in 
each of these three areas focus on the economic impact of post 9/11 trade, none of the 
literature has attempted to calculate the resulting cost associated with increases in the 
HSAS. 
The majority of the literature has been produced in conjunction with area or state 
economic development organizations, or by federal governmental organizations such as 
the United States General Accounting Office.  The methods of the studies vary from 
surveys of transport drivers, site visits and personal interviews, to a combination of  
 
 4
secondary sources reviews.  Impact studies on both the U.S. and Canadian economy have 
been conducted, while the issue on the Southern border has been one sided with limited 
information written concerning the impact on the Mexican economy. 
1. The U.S.-Canada Border 
Trade between the U.S. and Canada represents the largest bilateral trading 
relationship in the world.  Imports and exports to Canada account for approximately 20% 
of all U.S. trade.4  Prior to 9/11, a border-wide study of transit times had not been 
conducted.  In 2003, a U.S. Department of Transportation study by Taylor, Robidequx 
and Jackson looked at delays on the U.S.-Canada border.  The report assembled Canadian 
Customs archives, site visits to various POEs, and interviews with the main stakeholder 
to assess the economic impact of wait times, processing times, lost productivity, and fees.  
Taylor’s study found that the border management system and trade policies were costing 
the U.S. and Canadian economies an estimated $10.3 billion per year.  The study 
addressed the cause of the inefficiencies as being related to a combination of factors, 
“including a lack of sufficient federal inspection service booths at high volume crossings, 
and an inability to staff all booths during peak volumes.”5 
The economic impact of traffic congestion at the Windsor-Detroit crossing was 
the focus of a 2004 HBL Decision Economics study.  The report looked at two broad 
categories: the impact on cross-border freight movements and industry productivity on 
the just-in-time automobile supply chain; and the impact on cross-border personal trips 
for vacation, shopping, or recreation purposes.  The study projected that the mounting 
congestion and delays on the Michigan/Ontario border during the next two decades 
would cost the U.S. $11.4 billion per year in lost productivity, and 17,000 fewer jobs.6   
                                                 
4 Foreign Trade Division, U.S. Census Bureau, “Foreign Trade Statistics,” 
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top0803cm.html#imports (accessed June 2, 
2008). 
5 John C. Taylor, Douglas Robideaux and George C. Jackson, The U.S.-Canada Border: Cost Impacts, 
Causes, and Short to Long Term Management Options (n.p.: May 21, 2003), 7. 
6 HLB Decision Economics Inc., Regional and National Economic Impact of Increasing Delay and 
Delay Related Costs at the Windsor-Detroit Crossings (n.p.: January 2004). 
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The Ontario Chamber of Commerce Borders and Trade Development Committee 
conducted a 2004 study to quantify the post 9/11 impacts on Ontario and its businesses.  
The study is aimed at the trucking, automotive, and tourism industries; and how they are 
impacted by border delays.  The Ontario Chamber found that the average wait times to 
cross the U.S. border ranged between 60 and 120 minutes, costing the Ontario province 
$5.25 billion annually in lost revenue.7 
An additional study was conduced by DAMF Consultants Inc. in 2005 to assess 
how compliance with U.S. import security procedures at the Canada/U.S. border affected 
Canadian motor carriers operating in the United States.  The DAMF study makes a 
detailed review of U.S. border security measures and conducts a survey of Canadian 
carriers representing the main trucking industry segments.  The study found that 
increased truck delays resulting from U.S. security measures are costing the Canadian 
trucking industry between $179 million to $406 million per year.8 
2. The U.S.-Mexico Border 
Mexico is the United States’ second largest trading partner as it accounts for more 
than 11% of the total U.S. foreign trade, and ranks third in exports to the United States.9  
Most of the applicable literature written on the U.S. southern border is focused on freight 
movements, the sensitivity of the import/export sector to delays, and uncertainty in 
border transit times resulting from heightened security procedures.  One study that looked 
at the effects of border infrastructures prior to 9/11 was Keith Phillips’s report, 
Transportation: Infrastructure and the Border Economy.  Phillips highlights NAFTA’s 
dramatic increases in border traffic and how it has impacted border infrastructure.  His  
 
 
                                                 
7 Ontario Chamber of Commerce, “Cost of Border Delays to Ontario,” Ontario Chamber of Commerce 
and Borders and Trade Development Committee, May 2004, 
http://site.ebrary.com/lib/albertacel/Doc?id=10084345 (accessed March 28, 2008).  
8 Canada and others, The Cumulative Impact of U.S. Import Compliance Programs at the Canada/U.S. 
Land Border on the Canadian Trucking Industry: Final Report (Ottawa, Ont: Transport Canada, 2005), 58, 
http://www.tc.gc.ca/pol/en/Report/BorderStudy/Main.htm (accessed March 28, 2008). 
9 “Foreign Trade Statistics,” Foreign Trade Division, U.S. Census Bureau, 1. 
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2001 predictions indicate that, “border cities, particularly Laredo, will benefit from 
growth in the short-haul trucking industry, but efficiency in border transportation may 
result in reduced job growth on the border.”10  
The importance of wait times to Mexican based companies that export goods to 
the United States is examined in a San Diego Association of Governments study.  Border 
delays and their impact on a company’s profitability, employment, and exports are the 
focus of this report.  In 2005, traffic delays at the San Diego-Baja border cost the U.S. 
and Mexican economies an estimated $6 billion in gross output and more than 51,000 
jobs.11 
Tony Payan and Amanda Vasquez of the University of Texas at El Paso looked at 
the different initiatives undertaken after 9/11 to secure the U.S.-Mexico border.  The 
authors analyze the cost of border transactions to local retail businesses and the 
import/export sector.  Additionally, they look at how increased security measures affect 
the drayage transport system at the ports of entry.  They found a decrease in economic 
trade in the months that immediately followed 9/11 but no long-term impact on border 
wait times.12 
All of the mentioned studies on the U.S.-Canada/Mexico border are different in 
nature and were conducted for varying reasons.  However, the studies tend to focus on 
what impact border traffic and freight movements have on the economy. 
3. Maritime Port of Entry 
The majority of literature written on maritime shipping’s impact on homeland 
security has focused on the threat of a weapon of mass destruction arriving via a 
shipment container.  The Los Angeles and Long Beach ports are the largest in the United 
States.  The twin ports account for 17% of all U.S. exports and are responsible for 
                                                 
10 Keith R. Phillips and Carlos E. Manzanares, The Border Economy: Transportation Infrastructure 
and the Border Economy (n.p.: June 2001), 4. 
11 HDR/HLB Decision Economics Inc., Economic Impacts of Wait Times at the San Diego-Baja 
California Border (n.p.: January 2006). 
12 Tony Payan and Amanda Vasquez, Is it Worth the Candle? The Costs and Inconvenience of 
Homeland Security on the U.S.-Mexico Border (University of Texas at El Paso: November 1, 2005), 17. 
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delivering 43% of U.S. imports.  A disruption in the flow of cargo into the Los Angeles 
POE would have worldwide effects on commerce.  Studies of port closures have 
referenced the shutdown of the West Coast docks during the 2002 labor lockout costing 
in excess of $1.96 billion per day, and The Economic Impacts of Dirt Bomb Attacks on 
the Los Angeles and Long Beach Ports: Applying the Supply-Driven NIEMO incorporate 
this data in calculating the economic impact of terrorist attacks on the San Pedro Bay 
ports.13 
United States Government Accountability Office has addressed ways of 
streamlining the container Security process,14 and the implementation of the SAFE Port 
Act.15  Other authors like terrorism expert, Steven Flynn, have focused on the problems 
that would arise from “how the U.S. government would respond to an attack on a 
domestic seaport.”16  His works also suggests that an attack on a major seaport like Los 
Angeles would bring world commerce to a stand still.  However, similar to the Canada 
and Mexico borders, literature has not addressed the economic impact of changes in the 
HSAS threat level on the nation’s maritime ports of entry. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis uses three case studies to gain an overall perspective on how the 
HSAS affected the U.S. economy and CBP.  For determining the indirect economic 
impact, the case studies focus on daily cargo movements of imports at three of the United 
States’ largest ports of entry: Detroit, MI; Laredo, TX; and Los Angeles/Long Beach, 
                                                 
13 JiYoung Park, The Economic Impacts of Dirty Bomb Attacks on the Los Angeles and Long Beach 
Ports: Applying the Supply-Driven NIEMO (National Interstate Economic Model) (Los Angeles, CA: 
School of Policy, Planning, and Development; University of Southern California, 2007), 21. 
14 Richard M. Stana and others, “Container Security a Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum 
Equipment Requirements would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection Efforts: Report to 
Congressional Requesters,” U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05557.pdf (accessed June 2, 2008). 
15 Stephen L. Caldwell and others, “Maritime Security Observations on Selected Aspects of the SAFE 
Port Act: Testimony before the Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism, 
Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives,” U.S. Govt. Accountability Office, 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07754t.pdf (accessed June 2, 2008). 
16 Stephen E. Flynn and Council on Foreign Relations, The Edge of Disaster: Rebuilding a Resilient 
Nation, 1st ed. (New York: Random House: in cooperation with the Council on Foreign Relations, 2007), 
133. 
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CA.  Each of these ports was selected to provide a representation of the United States’ 
largest economic trading partners: Canada, Mexico, and China.  By comparing the 
amount of cargo transported through each POE during the seven periods of ORANGE 
between 2002-2005, against the days prior under threat level YELLOW, it is possible to 
determine how higher security conditions impacted the daily flow of goods into the 
United States.  By comparing CBP overtime payments during the same seven periods, it 
is possible to determine the direct financial impact on U.S. Customs and Boarder 
Protection.  Hopefully, this paper will provide DHS policy makers an accurate measure 
of the financial impact changes in the Homeland Security Advisory System have on both 
CBP and the U.S. Economy. 
 9
II. THE HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM 
On March 12, 2002, the Director of the White House Office of Homeland 
Security, Tom Ridge, announced the establishment of the Homeland Security Advisory 
System (HSAS).  In a White House press conference, Director Ridge introduced the 
HSAS with the following description: 
The Homeland Security Advisory System is designed to measure and 
evaluate terrorist threats and communicate them to the public in a timely 
manner.  It is a national framework; yet it is flexible to apply to threats 
made against a city, a state, a sector, or an industry.  It provides a common 
vocabulary, so officials from all levels of government can communicate 
easily with one another and to the public.  The system is designed to 
encourage partnerships between the public and the private sectors, 
between all levels of law enforcement and public safety officials, and 
between – and among all levels of government.  
A. HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES  
In the days following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. 
Government made a series of vague warnings recommending American citizens exercise 
higher vigilance.  Critics of the warnings felt the government recommendations were 
confusing to local authorities and alarming to the public.  In response to these claims, 
President Bush signed Homeland Security Presidential Directive-3 (HSPD-3) on March 
11, 2002.  HSPD-3 made the HSAS a binding directive for the federal government and 
suggested that other levels of government and the private sector implement the HSAS as 
well.17  HSPD-3 modeled the HSAS after the Department of Defense’s Threatcon system 
with five color-coded levels that each describes a different threat condition.  Each level 
then provides a list of recommended protective measures to implement as the alert level 
is raised (see Table 1).   
                                                 




Level Attack Protective Measures
GREEN Low Refining and exercising preplanned protective measures ensure
Low   personnel receive proper traning on the Homeland Security
  Advisory System and preplanned Protective Measures
Institutionalize processes to ensure all facilities and sectors are 
  regularly assessed for vulnerablities and measures to mitigate 
  terrorist attacks
BLUE General Check emergency response communications
Guarded Review and update emergency response procedures
Provide information to the public that will strengthen its ability to
  react appropriately
YELLOW Significant Increase surveillance of critical locations
Elevated Coordinate emergency plans with other federal, state and local
  agencies
Assess the threat and refine preplanned protective measures
Implement contingency and emergency response plans
ORANGE High Coordinate security effots with Federal, State, and local law
High   enforcement and armed forces organizations
Take additional precautions at public events, change venues, or 
  cancel if necessary
Prepare to execute contingency procedures--disperse workforce
Restrict threatened facility access to essential personnel only
RED Severe Increse or redirect personnel to address critical emergency needs
Severe Assign emergency response personnel and pre-position specially
  trained teams and resources
Monitor and redirect transportation systems
Close public and government facilities
                   Source: Homeland Security Presidential Directive 3, March 11, 2002
HSAS Threat Levels
 
Table 1.   The Homeland Security Advisory System 
HSPD-3 assigned the duties of administering the HSAS to the U.S. Attorney 
General.  The threat level was to be set by the Attorney General in consultation with the 
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and the members of the Homeland 
Security Council.  The Attorney General was also responsible for establishing a system to 
convey threat intelligence to federal, state, and local government officials, law 
enforcement agencies, and the private sector.  These responsibilities shifted during the 
following year with the passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which established 
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the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).18  The responsibility for administering the 
HSAS was transferred to DHS Under Secretary for Information and Analysis and 
Infrastructure Protection.  In February 2003, President Bush signed HSPD-5, which 
transferred responsibility to the Secretary of DHS for assigning the HSAS threat level 
and conveying related information.19  HSPD-5 still required the Secretary to consult with 
members of the Homeland Security Council, if time allowed, prior to assigning a threat 
level.  
B. CHANGES IN THE HSAS THREAT LEVEL 
Since Director Ridge’s introduction, the nation’s HSAS threat level has never 
been lower than YELLOW.  Between March 2002 and August 2005, there were seven 
periods that the HSAS was raised to ORANGE for the entire nation.  Some of these 
periods were as short as ten days and the longest period stretched over 102 calendar days.  
In total, the nation spent 236 calendar days in ORANGE between March 2002 and 
August 2005.  The threat level for a specific city reached RED for the first time on May 
11, 2005.  For eight minutes, government buildings in the District of Columbia were 
locked down as a small airplane flew within three miles of the White House and 
Capitol.20  Once the airplane was secured, the threat level returned to YELLOW.  The 
airline transportation sector has remained at ORANGE since the HSAS introduction in 
2002. 
Many state and local government agencies and some private companies have 
chosen not to implement certain ORANGE procedures during some of the seven periods.  
State and city officials have struggled with determining the actual risk to their 
populations when the national threat level has been raised.  While implementing 
ORANGE procedures has been an option for local leaders, in accordance with HSPD-3, 
compliance by federal government originations is mandatory. 
                                                 
18 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296, 107th Cong., November 25, 2002. 
19 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5: Management of Domestic Incidents, February 28, 
2003. 
20 Jim Miklaszewski, Pete Williams, and Tom Curry, “Day after Panic, D.C. Ponders Evacuation 




Date at ORANGE Reason for ORANGE threat level
1)
Sep 11, 2002 - Terrorist threat info from debriefings of senior
Sep 24, 2002 al Qaeda operative / 1 year anniversary of 9/11
2)
Feb 7, 2003 - Intel suggesting al Qaeda attacks on apt 
Feb 27, 2003 buildings, hotels, other soft skin targets
after Bali and Mombasa bombings during Hajj
3)
Mar 17, 2003 - Operation Liberty Shield--Intel indicated al Qaeda 
Apr 16, 2003 may attempt to launch attacks on U.S. interests to 
defend Muslims & Iraqi people / Start of OIF
4)
May 20, 2003 - Wake of bombings in Saudi Arabia & Morocco
May 30, 2003 Believed al Qaeda conducting world wide campaign
to attack Westerners / Memorial Day weekend
5)
Dec 21, 2003 - Increased terrorist communications indicating 
Jan 9, 2004 attacks during holiday season and beyond
using aircraft as a weapon
6)
Aug 1,2004 - Intel indicates that al Qaeda planning attacks on
Nov 10, 2004 financial institutions in New York, DC, and
New Jersey / ORANGE for financial sector only
7)
Jul 7, 2005 - Terrorist bombings of London subway
Aug 12, 2005 Threat level raised for mass transit sector only 
236 Total number of calendar days of Threat Level ORANGE










Table 2.   Seven Periods of ORANGE 
1. Period One 
On September 10, 2002, U.S. Attorney General Ashcroft announced in a press 
conference, “after conferring with the Homeland Security Council, the recommendation 
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has been made to increase the national threat level to High Risk.”  President Bush 
accepted the recommendation and the HSAS was raised to ORANGE for the first time for 
the entire nation.  According to General Ashcroft, the U.S. intelligence community had, 
“received information based on debriefings of a senior al Qaeda operative.”  The 
intelligence indicated that attacks were being planned around the anniversary of 9/11.  
Additional intelligence suggested car bombs and suicide bombers might be used against 
U.S. interests.  General Ashcroft indicated that the most likely targets would be against 
the, “transportation and energy sectors, and facilities or gatherings that would be 
recognized as symbols of American power.”  Director Ridge said the elevation of the 
HSAS to ORANGE would result in, “additional security personnel at federal facilities, 
the erection of barriers to adjust traffic flow, and more frequent inspections of people and 
cars entering federal facilities.”21  While answering questions from the press regarding 
the announcement, General Ashcroft said the intelligence that led to the elevation in the 
HSAS had been received within the previous 24-hours and was primarily focused 
overseas. 
On September 24, General Ashcroft and Director Ridge issued a joint statement 
announcing the decision to return the HSAS threat level to YELLOW.  General Ashcroft 
sited the arrest of six men in Buffalo; the capture of senior al Qaeda operatives in 
Pakistan, Singapore, and Yemen; and the passing of the 9/11 anniversary as reasons for 
the decision to return to YELLOW.22  The first period of threat level ORANGE lasted for 
14 days. 
2. Period Two 
On February 7, 2003 during a White House press conference, General Ashcroft, 
Secretary Ridge, and FBI Director Mueller announced the decision to again increase the 
HSAS to ORANGE.  The decision was based on specific intelligence that, “al Qaida may 
attempt to attack Americans in or around the end of the Hajj, a Muslim religious period 
                                                 
21 Director Ridge, Attorney General Ashcroft Discuss Threat Level, The Justice Department Office of 
the Press Secretary, September 10, 2002. 
22 “Threat Level Returns to ‘Elevated,’” Joint Statement of Attorney General John Ashcroft and 
Homeland Security Adviser Tom Ridge, Office of the U.S. Attorney General, September 24, 2002. 
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ending mid-February 2003.”  General Ashcroft emphasized apartment buildings, hotels 
and other soft skinned buildings as possible al Qaida targets in the United States.  
Additionally, a nightclub bombing in Bali, Indonesia; the bombing of a resort in 
Mombasa, Kenya; and the discovery of the chemical, ricin during an arrest in London, 
contributed to the decision to raise the threat level of the HSAS.  Secretary Ridge said the 
increase from YELLOW to ORANGE would result in, “increased security personnel at 
points of entry, additional protective measures at all federal agencies, and restrictions on 
travel around federal facilities and airports would be implemented.”23  In a separate press 
release, Secretary Ridge said the department of Customs and Border Protection would be 
increasing the number of secondary vehicle inspections with Non-Intrusive Inspection 
(NII) equipment for both passenger vehicles and cargo containers and trucks.24  
On February 27, General Ashcroft and Secretary Ridge announced the HSAS 
threat level would return to YELLOW.  The decision to lower the threat level was based 
on how intelligence had evolved, and “the passing of time period in or around the end of 
the Hajj.”25  This announcement ended the 21 days of ORANGE for period two. 
3. Period Three 
Three days prior to the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Secretary Ridge 
announced Operation Liberty Shield to increase protective measures to thwart attacks 
against the homeland.  Liberty Shield was based on intelligence estimates indicating, 
“terrorist will attempt multiple attacks against U.S. and Coalition targets worldwide in the 
event of a U.S.-led military campaign against Saddam Hussein.”26  The intelligence 
community believed that attacks would be conducted against the United States by al 
                                                 
23 “Homeland Security Threat Level Raised to Orange,” Remarks by Attorney General John Ashcroft, 
Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge, and FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, White House Press 
Conference, February 7, 2003. 
24 “Agency Actions in Response to the National Elevated Alert Level,” U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security Office of the Press Secretary, February 7, 2003. 
25 “Joint Statement of Attorney General John Ashcroft and Secretary of Homeland Security Tom 
Ridge,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of the Press Secretary, February 27, 2003. 
26 “Operation Liberty Shield: Statement by Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge,” U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security Office of the Press Secretary, March 17, 2003. 
 15
Qaida claiming they where defending Muslims or the Iraqi people.  Additionally, Iraqi 
state agents, surrogate groups, and other organizations could attempt attacks against 
United States interests.  On March 17, 2003, Secretary Ridge explained how Operation 
Liberty Shield would affect U.S. land and maritime borders.  Ships arriving and departing 
from U.S. ports would have armed Sea Marshals onboard to monitor the ship’s crew, 
increased patrols and surveillance of the land borders between major ports of entry, and 
increased screening of vehicles, personnel, and cargo crossing into the United States 
would be some of the primary actions to increase border security.27  Secretary Ridge 
continued to explain inspections at the land borders would not significantly impact the 
movement of people or cargo across the border. 
On April 16, Secretary Ridge sited a review of the intelligence assessment of 
threats and the drawing down of major combat operations in Iraq as the reason the HSAS 
was returned to YELLOW.28  Period three covered 31 days in ORANGE. 
4. Period Four 
After consulting with the Homeland Security Council, Secretary Ridge raised the 
HSAS again on May 20, 2003.  This elevation in the threat level came one week after 
terrorist bombings in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and Casablanca, Morocco.  The intelligence 
community believed that these events were part of an al Qaeda worldwide campaign.29  
The approaching Memorial Day weekend provided terrorists a number of opportunities, 
but U.S. officials said, “they were most worried about landmarks like the New York 
subway system, Sears Tower, and a number of sites in California.”30  The intelligence led  
 
 
                                                 
27 “Operation Liberty Shield,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of the Press Secretary, 
March 17, 2003. 
28 “Statement by Secretary Tom Ridge on Lowering the Threat Level on April 16th,” U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security Office of the Press Secretary, April 16, 2003. 
29 “Statement by Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge on Raising the Threat Level,” U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security Office of the Press Secretary, May 20, 2003. 
30 Mintz, John and Schmidt, Susan, “Government Raises Terror Alert Level to Orange; Officials Say 
Intelligence Suggests Al Qaeda Attacks,” The Washington Post, May 21, 2003, A.01. 
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officials to believe that the largest threat was to facilities where Westerners congregate in 
North Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.31  DHS did not provide specific 
information as to how procedures would be affected at U.S. Ports of Entry. 
Eleven days later, Secretary Ridge announced the HSAS would return to 
YELLOW.  He relayed the decision was based upon a, “review of the intelligence and the 
passing of heightened vulnerability associated with the Memorial Day holiday.”32 
5. Period Five 
After more than six months without a change to the HSAS, December 21, 2003 
marked the fifth time the threat level was raised to ORANGE.  Secretary Ridge revealed, 
“the intelligence community has received a substantial increase in the volume of threat-
related intelligence reports suggesting the possibility of attacks against the homeland 
around the holiday season and beyond.”33  In Secretary Ridge’s address, he indicated that 
al Qaida was still interested in using aircraft as weapons.  To deter an attack the 
government would increase security at the nation’s airports and transportation systems, 
re-deploy agents to the borders, and increase Coast Guard air and sea patrols.34 
On January 9, 2004, Secretary Ridge announced that after careful review of the 
intelligence information and the passing of seasonal holiday gatherings, the HSAS threat 
level would return to YELLOW.35  The Secretary’s remarks ended the 20-day period of 
threat level ORANGE. 
                                                 
31 Mintz, John and Schmidt, Susan, “Government Raises Terror Alert Level to Orange; Officials Say 
Intelligence Suggests Al Qaeda Attacks,” The Washington Post, May 21, 2003, A.01. 
32 “Statement by Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge on Lowering the Threat Level.” U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security Office of the Press Secretary, May 30, 2003. 
33 “Remarks by Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge at a Press Conference Announcing the 
Raising of the National Threat Level,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of the Press 
Secretary, December 21, 2003. 
34 Ibid. 
35 “Remarks for Secretary Tom Ridge Threat Level Press Conference; Remarks by Secretary Tom 
Ridge on Lowering National Threat Level to Yellow,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of the 
Press Secretary, January 9, 2004. 
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6. Period Six 
August 1, 2004 was the first time the HSAS was raised to ORANGE for a specific 
sector of the nation.  Secretary Ridge announced the intelligence community had 
intercepted multiple messages indicating, “al Qaeda was targeting the financial services 
sector in New York City, Northern New Jersey and Washington, D.C.”36 Some of the 
protective actions to be implemented were buffer zones to secure the perimeter of these 
buildings, restrictions on underground parking, an increased law enforcement presence, 
and a screening of vehicles entering financial buildings.37  This action was unique in that 
the HSAS threat level was raised for a very narrow sector of industry.  Secretary Ridge 
indicated financial buildings in the Mid West and West Coast did not appear to be as 
threatened. 
On November 10, 2004, Secretary Ridge lowered the HSAS threat level for the 
financial sector.  He sited the implementation of permanent buffer zones, communication 
systems, exercises, and the review of business’s continuity plans as the reason for being 
able to reduce the threat level back to YELLOW after 102 days.38  
7. Period Seven 
The London subway bombings on July 7, 2005 marked the seventh time the 
HSAS was raised to ORANGE for the nation.  DHS Secretary Chertoff announced that in 
light of the attacks, “the mass transit portion of the transportation sector, including 
passenger rail, subways, and metropolitan bus systems would be raised to ORANGE.”39  
The Secretary indicated that the department had no credible information suggesting an 
imminent attack on the United States.  Just as during period six, the HSAS was targeted 
for a specific sector. 
                                                 
36 “Remarks by Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge Regarding Recent Threat Reports,” U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security Office of Press Secretary, August 1, 2004. 
37 Ibid. 
38 “Statement by Department of Homeland Security on Lowering of Threat Level for Financial Service 
Sector,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of Press Secretary, November 10, 2004. 
39 “Transcript from Secretary Michael Chertoff Press Briefing on the London Bombings,” U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security Office of Press Secretary, July 7, 2005. 
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On August 12, 2005, Secretary Chertoff announced the threat level for mass 
transit systems would be reduced to YELLOW.  He sited the “development and 
implementation of long-term sustainable mass transit security measures” as the reason for 
the reduction.40  The decrease ended the 37-day period in threat level ORANGE for the 
transportation sector. 
Based on open source intelligence, each of the seven periods is unique as to why 
the threat level of the HSAS was raised.  Some of the intelligence was specific to certain 
sectors and regions of the country, and some of the intelligence was broad and non 
descript.  Often policy makers’ decisions have far-reaching unintentional effects as the 
threat level of the HSAS was raised.  It is important to consider the intelligence for each 
of the seven periods and how it related to additional costs for CBP while not reducing the 
flow of imports into the United States. 
 
                                                 
40 “Statement by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff on Lowering the National Threat 
Level for the Mass Transit Sector,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of Press Secretary, 
August 12, 2005. 
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III. THE CANADIAN CONNECTION 
A. DETROIT-WINDSOR AND THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 
Canada and the United States represent the largest bi-national trading partnership 
in the world.  According to the Ontario Chamber of Commerce, “each day more than $1 
billion in trade cross the U.S.-Canada border, and 70% of that trade is moved by truck.”41  
At the heart of this relationship is the automotive industry, as vehicle parts cross from 
factories to assembly lines on each side of the border.  The Detroit-Windsor corridor 
represents 42% of Canada’s trade with the U.S. and has made the Ambassador Bridge the 
busiest border crossing in the world.42  This chapter will focus on the than 6,000 
commercial trucks per day that cross the Ambassador Bridge.  To put this in perspective, 
the corridor delivers more goods than are traded between the countries of Germany and 
France each day.43  The Ambassador Bridge system was designed to handle 
approximately 1,700 vehicles per hour, and the 2003 Belzer Report indicated, “the bridge 
system was approaching 92% capacity.”44  Belzer also reveals that, “between 1990 and 
2000, commercial truck traffic between Canada and the United States grew at an annual 
average rate of 13.3%.”45  The Ontario Chamber of Commerce projects that truck traffic 
is “likely to increase by 118% over the next 30 years.”46   
Border delays at the Ambassador Bridge cost each country billions of dollars in 
lost productivity and additional trucking costs, and have adverse environmental impacts.  
The just-in-time delivery system of the automotive industry and other vital areas of the 
                                                 
41 Ontario Chamber of Commerce, “Cost of Border Delays to Ontario,” Ontario Chamber of 
Commerce and Borders and Trade Development Committee. May 2004, 5. 
42 Ibid., 10. 
43 Aaron Sydor, “NAFTA@Ten: A Preliminary Report,” Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade, 2003, 44. 
44 Michael H. Belzer, The Jobs Tunnel: The Economic Impact of Adequate Border-Crossing 
Infrastructure, Produced for The Jobs Tunnel Detroit River Tunnel Partnership, November 3, 2003, 8. 
45 Ibid., 44. 
46 Ontario Chamber of Commerce, “Cost of Border Delays to Ontario,” Ontario Chamber of 
Commerce and Borders and Trade Development Committee. May 2004, 11. 
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manufacturing sector are the hardest hit by unexpected border delays.  For industries that 
require large parts, keeping extra inventories can become extremely expensive.  The just-
in-time delivery system depends on efficient and timely delivery of components, and 
provides the industry an excellent way to reduce on site inventories and lower capital 
requirements, which in return minimizes costs.  The Center for Automotive Research has 
determined that, “it cost $432,000 in additional capital for a U.S. automotive assembly 
plant to carry one additional hour’s worth of production inventory.”47  There are 
numerous examples of how the just-in-time delivery system can be adversely affected by 
border delays.  Cadillac car seats are made in Windsor and then custom loaded onto 
trucks so that when they are unloaded in Detroit, the seats match up with the correct car 
on the assembly line.  In the city of Windsor, a truck leaves the Chrysler parts factory 
every twenty minutes destined for a Detroit assembly factory.48  The timing of the truck’s 
arrival is critical; if it arrives too early, it will have to wait until there is available room to 
offload its newly produced components.  This results in lost productivity for the truck 
owner and increases transportation costs in fuel and hourly wages for the driver.  Trucks 
that arrive more than 60 minutes late will typically result in some type of assembly plant 
disruption to include a possible assembly line shutdown.  In the example of the Cadillac 
seats, a past delay from U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) inspectors resulted in 
a complete shut down of an entire facility’s assembly lines while waiting for the correct 
seats to arrive.49  In the aftermath of September 11, these types of issues forced Ford and 
Chrysler to close six of their Detroit car assembly plants temporarily due to a lack of 
components.50  The efficiency of the just-in-time delivery system of Detroit-Winsor 
industries makes erratic border delays extremely costly to both the United States and 
Canada. 
                                                 
47 David J. Andrea and Brett C. Smith, The Canada-U.S. Border: An Automotive Case Study (Ann 
Arbor, MI: January 2002), 18. 
48 Skip McMahon of Canadian Transit, telephone interview with the author, June 24, 2008.  
49 Patrick Reed of the Detroit CBP Field Office, telephone interview with the author, September 11, 
2008. 
50 Peter Andreas and Thomas J. Biersteker, The Rebordering of North America: Integration and 
Exclusion in a New Security Context (New York: London: Routledge, 2003), 115. 
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The Ambassador Bridge traffic generated by the automotive industry follows a 
weekly cycle and is significantly impacted by both U.S. and Canadian holidays.  
Typically Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday are the busiest days of the week for 
commercial traffic.  Commercial traffic across the bridge is drastically reduced on the 
weekend.  However, according to CBP Patrick Reed, “the total amount of traffic for CBP 
remains constant as the number of private autos dramatically increases from weekend 
travelers.”51  Agent Reed also indicated that each year the bridge experiences a drop in 
commercial traffic during the month of July as automobile factories on both sides of the 
border shut down to retool the assembly lines for the next year’s vehicle models.  
B. THE AMBASSADOR BRIDGE SYSTEM 
Construction on the world’s longest international suspension bridge began in May 
of 1927, and the Ambassador Bridge was completed in November of 1929.  The bridge 
project was the private financial venture of Mr. Joseph Bower, a Detroit banker, working 
through the American and Canadian Transit Companies.  The stock market crash of 1929 
and the start of World War II both caused difficult financial operations during the 
bridge’s first two decades of use.  As a result of financial reorganization and increased 
traffic during the post war years, the bridge began experiencing financial prosperity and 
has continued to remain profitable as trade between Canada and the United States has 
grown.  The bridge is remarkable for many reasons, one being vehicles actually drive 
north to reach the United States and south into Canada.  
The Ambassador Bridge has experienced only minor upgrades since its 
completion in 1929.  The bridge’s four-lane roadway was overhauled and upgraded with 
an asphalt overlay in 1970, and electrical wiring and paint have been replaced and 
updated periodically.52  Most of the improvements to the bridge system have been 
focused on the addition of each countries custom’s terminals, inspection facilities, and 
administrative offices. 
                                                 
51 Patrick Reed of the Detroit CBP Field Office, telephone interview with the author, September 11, 
2008. 
52 “Improving the Bridge,” Ambassador Bridge, 
http://www.ambassadorbridge.com/history/improving_the_bridge.html (accessed August 25, 2008). 
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Prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, six inspection booths were operated by the U.S. 
Customs Office.  According to the Canadian Transit Company, “normally five of the 
booths were manned and 99% of the time there were no problems with the backup of 
trucks entering the United States.”53  Canadian Transit data indicated that on September 
10, 2001 the average commercial truck took approximately 30 seconds to pass through 
the U.S. Custom’s booths.  On the following afternoon, it took commercial trucks an 
average of two hours to pass through customs due to a much higher degree of 
inspection.54  The weeks following 9/11 saw significant disruption of automotive 
production schedules, reduction of vehicle production, and the closure of factories due to 
unpredictable border transportation.  According to the Andrea study, by December 2001, 
the situation had stabilized and the Detroit-Winsor “border crossing times were consistent 
enough to meet the needs of the industry’s just-in-time logistical requirements.”55  The 
following year, the Untied States added three more customs booths, and in 2004, four 
additional booths opened, bringing the total to thirteen U.S. Customs inspection booths 
for commercial vehicles.56  After 9/11 and prior to opening the additional booths for 
commercial traffic, it was common for trucks traveling into the United States to back up 
three or four miles into Canada each day.57  According to Canadian Transit Company 
officials, the average processing time for commercial vehicles is two and a half minutes, 
which could translate into 30 to 60 minutes of wait time for a commercial driver to cross 
the border during peak traffic periods.   
Detroit and Windsor are also linked with a second transportation connection, the 
Detroit-Windsor Tunnel.  The tunnel is a mile long portal dug under the Detroit River 
approximately one half mile north of the Ambassador Bridge.  The history of the Detroit-
Windsor Tunnel dates back to the 1870s, but it was not opened to vehicle traffic until 
                                                 
53 Skip McMahon of Canadian Transit, telephone interview with the author, June 24, 2008. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Andrea and Smith, The Canada-U.S. Border: An Automotive Case Study, 1. 
56 Patrick Reed of the Detroit CBP Field Office, telephone interview with the author, September 11, 
2008. 
57 Skip McMahon of Canadian Transit, telephone interview with the author, June 24, 2008. 
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1930.58  The two lane tunnel connects downtown Detroit with the Windsor business 
district.  Each day more than 350 commercial vehicles pass through the Detroit-Winsor 
Tunnel.  However, a 13 feet height restriction and a tunnel width of only 22 feet limit the 
size of trucks that can pass through the tunnel.  A spiral exit ramp at each end of the 
tunnel limits the length of commercial vehicles as well. Additionally, the traffic 
congestion in each city’s downtown districts reduces the tunnel’s use by long haul 
commercial vehicles.  There are several ferries that operate on the Detroit River, but their 
limited number, cargo capacity, speed, and cost make them impractical to industry. The 
next closest connection between Detroit and Windsor is the Blue Water Bridge in Port 
Huron, Michigan.  Transporting goods from Windsor to Detroit via the Blue Water 
Bridge would require an additional 160 miles and four hours of travel to move goods 
from the towns that sit less than one mile apart.  The unique geography of this region, 
Lake St. Clair and Lake Erie, make the Ambassador Bridge the critical infrastructure link 
between the Untied States and Canada.  
C. PORT OF DETROIT CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION 
The Port of Detroit (PoD), also know as Service Port Detroit, is the U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection’s office responsible for securing the United States’ land border in 
the Detroit area.  PoD provides a wide rage of cargo processing functions that include 
inspections, entry, collections, and verification.59  The office is responsible for facilities 
and crossings at the Ambassador Bridge, the Detroit City Airport, the Detroit Marine 
Office, the Detroit-Windsor Tunnel, as well as several other small seaport facilities.  CBP 
operations at Detroit’s international airports fall under the responsibility of Customs and 
Border’s Detroit Metropolitan Airport office and are beyond the scope of this paper.  The 
main effort of PoD is focused on the Ambassador Bridge and the Detroit-Windsor 
Tunnel.  These two locations along with the Fort Street Cargo Facility are the only CBP 
facilities manned 24 hours a day seven days a week.  The seaports and the Detroit City 
                                                 
58 “Tunnel History,” Detroit-Winsor Tunnel, http://www.dwtunnel.com/history/tunnel-history 
(accessed September 10, 2008). 
59 “Service Port-Detroit,” CBP.gov, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/toolbox/contacts/ports/mi/3801.xml 
(accessed September 11, 2008). 
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Airport CBP offices are open eight hours a day, or on case by case requests.  Several 
hundred CBP officers and administration staff are assigned to Service Port Detroit, and 
the office’s annual budget reaches into the millions of dollars.  It is common for officers 
to be assigned to multiple areas of responsibility within the PoD, and specific 
assignments vary in length from as long as one year to as short as two weeks.60 
1.  Inspections 
PoD is responsible for approving the entry of more than 6,000 commercial 
vehicles into the United States from the Ambassador Bridge each day.  To accomplish 
this daunting task, the inspection process actually begins well before a truck arrives at the 
bridge.  In accordance with CBP procedures, agents at PoD are provided a current 
intelligence brief at the start of each shift.  This briefing covers details such as the status 
of the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) and information directly relative to 
PoD operations.  The briefing helps set the agent’s state of mind for the upcoming shift.  
More intelligence actions are conducted by PoD’s intelligence targeting cell prior to a 
tucks arrival.  The Trade Act of 2004 requires that commercial carriers electronically 
send truck manifest data a minimum of one hour prior to a truck’s arrival at the boarder.  
According to Patrick Reed of CBP’s Detroit Field Office, “today greater than 99% of the 
manifests arrive prior to the truck.”61  Agent Reed indicated that of the fraction of trucks 
that arrive without a manifest on file, the most common reason was a problem with the 
processing software.  The intelligence-targeting cell uses the truck manifest to calculate 
the level of risk associated with each shipment.  PoD’s targeting cell uses a computer-
automated matrix to assess the risk of the shipper, the trucking company, brokers and 
import agents, as well as the actual cargo.  Additionally, the PoD targeting cell uses a 
number of other factors for determining a shipments risk level, which are beyond the  
 
 
                                                 




classification of this paper.  If a truck arrives without the required manifest, then it does 
not enter the United States until the proper paper work is provided and cleared by the 
targeting cell. 
If the PoD intelligence-targeting cell determines a specific truck or its contents 
require a closer inspection, that information is immediately available to the CBP booth 
agent when the truck arrives at the border.  Additionally, 100% of vehicles crossing the 
Ambassador Bridge into the United States pass through Radiation Portal Monitors 
(RPM).  RPMs are a stationary passive system that is a safe and effective way to scan 
traffic and cargo quickly for nuclear and radioactive materials.  The RPMs are on fixed 
sites at the Detroit land border.  They are setup so that a vehicle drives through the 
detectors prior to arriving at a CBP entry booth.62  The RPMs are extremely sensitive and 
detections are more common than a person might think.  If a vehicle sets off the RPM, 
then CBP agents use hand-held radiation detectors and radiation isotope identifying 
devices to determine exact data on the radioactive material.  These hand-held devices 
record the isotopes and that data is electronically sent to the intelligence-targeting cell.  
The targeting cell compares the readings with the truck manifest and cargo information to 
determine if the isotope matches known natural occurring radioactive materials found in 
that type of cargo.  Common examples of cargo containing naturally occurring 
radioactive materials are earthen pots, fertilizers, and raw building materials.  The entire 
process for inspecting an activated RPM can take place in as little as ten minutes.  This 
allows the CBP booth agent to determine quickly if the vehicle can be cleared into the 
United States, or needs to be detained for a more detailed search. 
Once the targeting cell has determined a commercial truck has an increased level 
of risk, PoD agents have a number of options as to the type of inspection to be conducted.  
The Detroit Field Office currently has four Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) mobile 
vehicles and one fixed NII site at the Ambassador Bridge capable of scanning large cargo 
containers.63  The NII devices use X-ray technology to produce images of the cargo 
                                                 




without having to unload the truck.  The devices are capable of scanning through steel 
walls as wide as 11 inches thick.  The NII mobile vehicles are mounted on the back of a 
semi truck and have a high tech operation control facility where CBP agents can real time 
assess the images of suspect cargo.  The NII process is relatively slow and labor intensive 
in comparison with the RPM passive detector.  A typical NII will require more than 10 
minutes to setup, produce an image, and have a CBP agent interpret the image for each 
truck.64  During a NII, the CBP agent is focused on looking for anomalies in the cargo’s 
packing.  Items that do not match the manifest, unsymmetrical boxes and hollow space in 
the container are common alerts that raise attention for more detailed searches. 
CBP agents may decide to conduct a “tailgate inspection” based on the targeting 
cell warnings, or in conjunction with the results of the NII.  Again, this type of search is 
time consuming and labor intensive.  Agents open up the back tailgate of a truck or 
container and randomly check the contents against the cargo manifest.  This process can 
sometimes be relatively dangerous to CBP personnel as the internal cargo often shifts 
during transport.  CBP officers must also keep detailed records of the container’s seal 
numbers removed and replaced during a tailgate inspection to ensure the integrity of the 
shipping process.  During a tailgate inspection, CBP officers are looking for a wide range 
of threats.  Improper trademark labeling, tariffs, import quotas, agricultural issues, 
narcotics, human trafficking, and terrorism are among the diverse range of threats CBP 
officers must quickly assess during a tailgate search of the cargo.  According to CBP 
Operations Specialist, Gabriel Padilla, shippers looking to smuggle illegal goods into the 
United States are aware of CBP’s search process and often pack the illegal goods in the 
front of containers to reduce the chance of being detected during a tailgate inspection.65 
The most costly and labor intensive inspection conducted by CBP would be to 
unload an entire truck and search its contents.  This process is conducted at CBP 
warehouses near the Ambassador Bridge and throughout the city of Detroit.  CBP uses a 
contractor to provide the labor force responsible for unloading and reloading the cargo.  
                                                 
64 CBP NII field demonstration provide by Los Angeles/Long Beach Seaport CBP agents for the 
author on August 29, 2008. 
65 Gabriel Padilla of the Los Angeles CBP Field Office, personal interview with the author, August 29, 
2008. 
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Once contractors have unloaded a truck, CBP agents search through the cargo.  They 
open boxes, use hand-held radiation detectors, canines, and x-ray machines to inspect the 
cargo.  This process is extremely expensive, labor intensive, and time consuming.  It 
could take four to six hours to unload, inspect, and reload a truck.  U.S. Customs 
Officials at the Detroit Field Office would not indicate the exact number of commercial 
trucks fully unloaded and searched each day, but it was revealed that the number was less 
than 100 commercial vehicles.66  
The implementation of NAFTA and other reductions in trade restrictions between 
the United States and Canada might have appeared to reduce CBP’s workload in theory.  
In actuality, however, free trade has increased CBP’s workload at the northern border.  
According to Agent Reed, since NAFTA took effect, more and more foreign exporters 
have attempted to bring their goods into the United States through Canada in an attempt 
to try and take advantage of the free trade agreement.67 
2.  Overtime Data 
CBP operations at the Ambassador Bridge are conducted seven days a week, 24 
hours a day.  There is virtually no difference between weekday or weekend duty for PoD 
officials.  PoD manning normally allows for eight-hour work shifts and a normal 
workweek of 40 hours.  During certain conditions, longer work shifts or additional man-
hours may be required to meet the demand of inspecting imports and securing the border.  
Overtime payments at PoD occur anytime an employee works more than an eight-hour 
day or 40 hours a week.68   
Table 3 depicts CBP overtime spending under threat condition YELLOW and 
threat condition ORANGE during each of the seven periods between 2002 and 2005.  It 
should be noted that it is extremely difficult to compare daily overtime data from year to 
year during this time frame.  The total manning and budget of PoD drastically increased 
                                                 





from 2002 to 2005 with the merger of U.S. Customs and the U.S. Border Patrol under the 
Department of Homeland Security.  Additionally, seasonal changes in trade and 
fluctuations in the U.S. economy make comparisons between each of the seven periods 
difficult due to a number of constantly changing variables.  For these reasons, this case 
study focused on comparing the periods under threat level ORANGE with the same 
number of days previously under threat level YELLOW.  CBP manning, seasonal 
fluctuations in trade, and the overall state of the U.S. economy would have remained 
relativity constant during the comparison of each of these short periods.  This method 
allows as many variables as possible to remain constant while measuring the impact of 
changes in the HSAS. 
     Port of Detroit Overtime Data 2002-2005
1)
28 Aug 2002 -- 10 Sep 2002 = 14 days Yellow 159,530.86$          Terrorist threat info from debriefings of senior
11 Sep 2002 -- 24 Sep 2002 = 14 days Orange 172,169.36$          al Qaeda operative / 1 year anniversary of 9/11
% Delta 7.92%
2)
17 Jan 2003 -- 6 Feb 2003 = 21 days Yellow 126,220.47$          Intel suggesting al Qaeda attacks on apt 
7 Feb 2003 -- 27 Feb 2003 = 21 days Orange 176,021.03$          buildings, hotels, other soft skin targets
% Delta 39.46% after Bali and Mombasa bombings during Hajj
3) 
28 Feb 2003 -- 16 Mar 2003 = 17* days Yellow 187,188.01$          Operation Liberty Shield--Intel indicated al Qaeda 
17 Mar 2003 -- 16 Apr 2003 = 31 days Orange 239,977.53$          may attempt to launch attacks on U.S. interests to 
% Delta 28.20% defend Muslims & Iraqi people / Start of OIF
4) 
9 May 2003 -- 19 May 2003 = 11 days Yellow 73,442.73$            Wake of bombings in Saudi Arabia & Morocco
20 May 2003 -- 30 May 2003 = 11 days Orange 77,011.39$            Believed al Qaeda conducting world wide campaign
% Delta 4.86% to attack Westerners / Memorial Day weekend
5)
1 Dec 2003 -- 20 Dec 2003 = 20 days Yellow 113,695.45$          Increased terrorist communications indicating 
21 Dec 2003 -- 9 Jan 2004 = 20 days Orange 115,336.16$          attacks during holiday season and beyond
% Delta 1.44% using aircraft as a weapon
6) 
21 Apr 2004 -- 31 July 2004 = 102 days Yellow 722,754.37$          Intel indicates that al Qaeda planning attacks on
1 Aug 2004 -- 10 Nov 2004 = 102 days Orange 1,137,577.47$       financial institutions in New York, DC, and
% Delta 57.39% New Jersey / ORANGE for financial sector only
7)
31 May 2005 -- 6 July 2005 = 37 days Yellow 384,868.83$          Terrorist bombings of London subway
7 July 2005 -- 12 Aug 2005 = 37 days Orange 466,755.44$          Threat level raised for mass transit sector only 
% Delta 21.28%
Yellow Total 2002-2005 $1,767,700.72
Orange Total 2002-2005 $2,384,848.38
Average % Delta 2002-2005 34.91%
* Only 17 days under YELLOW since previous ORANGE.  Numbers reflect the 17 day average x 31.  
Table 3.   Port of Detroit Overtime Data  
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The PoD overtime payments consistently increased during the periods of 
ORANGE indicating an increased activity level by CPB Port of Detroit personnel as the 
HSAS threat posture was increased.  This study assumes that the additional overtime 
spending was used as a direct result of the increase in the nation’s threat posture.  CBP 
records detailing the exact reason for the increase in overtime spending, the number of 
inspections conducted each day, or the number of agents on duty each day was either not 
kept on a daily basis or was no longer available from CBP’s historical records.69   
In total, between 2002 and 2005, PoD spent 34.91% more in overtime payments 
during periods of ORANGE than during the same number of day’s prior under 
YELLOW.70  This data indicates that the DHS policy makers’ decision to adjust the 
HASA has far-reaching effects beyond the specific areas intelligence suggested were at 
risk.  One hypothesis regarding the 35% increase in overtime is that CBP would have 
conducted inspections on more vehicles and conducted more detailed inspections, both 
resulting in longer border delays during an elevated threat posture.  A counter hypothesis 
is that more overtime would have resulted in more CBP agents available to staff more 
inspections stations and tollbooths, allowing traffic to flow into the United States more 
quickly.  
D.  AMBASSADOR BRIDGE CARGO DATA 
Of the $1 billion worth of goods that travel across the northern border each day, 
historically, it has been extremely difficult to determine the exact quantity that entered 
the U.S. economy on a specific date.  Most businesses and government agencies 
responsible for recording data on imports keep the information on a monthly or quarterly 
basis.  Daily fluctuations can be significant and both sectors prefer to use monthly and 
quarterly averages to compare imports from year to year.  As a result, the actual data on 
specifically how many imports enter the United States on a certain day become lost as 
                                                 
69 Kathleen McKevitt Director, Strategic Planning CBP Office of Field Operations, phone interviews 
with the author August 2008.  
70 Port of Detroit overtime data provided by US Customs & Border Protection Office of Field 
Operations, via Mr. Daniel R. Meyer, CBP HQ Budget Management & Program Analyst, phone and e-mail 
interviews with the author July 22, 2008. 
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data is aggregated into monthly and quarterly averages.  The merger of U.S. Customs and 
U.S. Border Patrol within DHS has also made it difficult to obtain daily records between 
2002 and 2005.  Through the merger, numerous new computer programs for the 
combined operations of CBP resulted in the daily records being discarded and only the 
monthly averages being transferred into the current computer programs.  However, in the 
case of the Ambassador Bridge, one company has been recording the daily flow of cargo 
between Detroit and Windsor for nearly 80 years.  The Canadian Transit Company has 
kept daily records on the number of vehicles that cross the Ambassador Bridge every 
day.71 
    Ambassador Bridge Commercial Traffic 2002-2005
Number of Commercial Vehicles
1)
28 Aug 2002 -- 10 Sep 2002 = 14 days YELLOW 56,682 Terrorist threat info from debriefings of senior
11 Sep 2002 -- 24 Sep 2002 = 14 days ORANGE 66,327 al Qaeda operative / 1 year anniversary of 9/11
% Delta 17.02%  increase
2)
17 Jan 2003 -- 6 Feb 2003 = 21 days YELLOW 97,421 Intel suggesting al Qaeda attacks on apt 
7 Feb 2003 -- 27 Feb 2003 = 21 days ORANGE 93,571 buildings, hotels, other soft skin targets
% Delta 3.95% decrease after Bali and Mombasa bombings during Hajj
3) 
28 Feb 2003 -- 16 Mar 2003 = 17* days YELLOW 130,313 Operation Liberty Shield--Intel indicated al Qaeda 
17 Mar 2003 -- 16 Apr 2003 = 31 days ORANGE 142,793 may attempt to launch attacks on U.S. interests to 
% Delta 9.58% increase defend Muslims & Iraqi people / Start of OIF
4) 
9 May 2003 -- 19 May 2003 = 11 days YELLOW 43,605 Wake of bombings in Saudi Arabia & Morocco
20 May 2003 -- 30 May 2003 = 11 days ORANGE 51,063 Believed al Qaeda conducting world wide campaign
% Delta 17.11% increase to attack Westerners / Memorial Day weekend
5)
1 Dec 2003 -- 20 Dec 2003 = 20 days YELLOW 97,270 Increased terrorist communications indicating 
21 Dec 2003 -- 9 Jan 2004 = 20 days ORANGE 47,525 attacks during holiday season and beyond
% Delta 51.14% decrease using aircraft as a weapon
6) 
21 Apr 2004 -- 31 July 2004 = 102 days YELLOW 440,754 Intel indicates that al Qaeda planning attacks on
1 Aug 2004 -- 10 Nov 2004 = 102 days ORANGE 488,584 financial institutions in New York, DC, and
% Delta 10.85% increase New Jersey / ORANGE for financial sector only
7)
31 May 2005 -- 6 July 2005 = 37 days YELLOW 175,496 Terrorist bombings of London subway
7 July 2005 -- 12 Aug 2005 = 37 days ORANGE 153,477 Threat level raised for mass transit sector only 
% Delta 12.55% decrease
Commercial Vehicles during YELLOW 2002-2005 1,041,541
Commercial Vehicles during ORANGE 2002-2005 1,043,340
Average % Delta 2002-2005 0.17% increase of traffic during ORANGE
* Only 17 days under Yellow since previous Orange.  Numbers reflect the 17 day average x 31.  
Table 4.   Ambassador Bridge Commercial Traffic  
                                                 
71 Ambassador Bridge Commercial Traffic data provide to the author by the Canadian Transit 
Company, September 18, 2008. 
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The same methodology of comparing the volume of commercial vehicles during 
each of the seven periods when the HSAS was raised to threat level ORANGE versus the 
same number of days prior under YELLOW was utilized to minimize the number of 
variables.  Similar to the PoD overtime data, fluctuations in seasonal trade, national 
holidays, and the overall state of the economy of both countries affect the daily volume of 
commercial vehicles that cross the bridge into the United States.  
This study found the number of commercial vehicles entering the Untied States 
actually increased slightly during the periods of a higher threat level.  Only three of the 
seven periods experienced a decrease in the number of commercial vehicles.  A closer 
look at the raw data and the dates indicates that the decrease during periods five and 
seven were most likely not related to the elevation of the HSAS.  Thirteen of the 20 days 
during period five fall over the Christmas and New Years holidays.  The raw traffic count 
indicates that starting on Christmas Eve, a significant decrease in commercial traffic 
occurred through Monday, January 5. This decrease is consistent with the closure of most 
United States businesses and factories during the holiday season.  Twenty-five of the 37 
days of ORANGE during period seven fall in the month of July.  As previously stated, 
the automotive industry closes assembly lines during the month of July to re-tool for the 
upcoming year model. The raw traffic data supports this fact with significant reductions 
in commercial traffic starting on July 1 and ending on July 25. 
When considering the reasons for the decrease of traffic during periods five and 
seven, the total number of commercial vehicles from 2002 to 2005 during ORANGE 
should have been significantly higher when compared to the same number of days under 
threat level YELLOW.  One hypothesis might lead to the conclusion that an increase in 
CBP overtime actually increases the flow of commercial vehicles across the Ambassador 
Bridge. 
A second and more likely hypothesis is that the limited numbers of vehicles that 
pass through a NII, tailgate, or full inspection have little effect on the overall flow of 
goods across the Ambassador Bridge.  PoD is currently only able to inspect 1% of the 
6,000 commercial vehicles fully that cross the bridge each day, then doubling or even 
tripling the number of full inspections during elevations of the HSAS has limited impact 
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on the overall flow of import across the Ambassador Bridge.  Only if PoD attempted to 
inspect 10-20% of the commercial vehicles fully during a threat level ORANGE would 
the nation start to experience a decrease in the flow of imports across the Ambassador 
Bridge. 
Data from PoD indicated that an increase in the HSAS threat level had a direct 
impact on additional costs for CBP.  Service Port-Detroit spent 35% more in overtime 
during ORANGE than it did previously during YELLOW.  It resulted in an additional 
$617,000 in spending.  However, the number of commercial vehicles crossing the 
Ambassador Bridge actually increased during the periods of ORANGE.  This data 
indicates the HSAS had no affect on limiting the daily flow of imports into the United 
States. 
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IV. A BRIDGE TO MEXICO 
Mexico, the United States’ second largest trading partner, accounts for more than 
11% of U.S. foreign trade and is the third largest exporter of goods to the United States.72  
The Port of Laredo Texas is the largest inland port on the U.S.-Mexico Border and is 
responsible for 40% of all U.S.-Mexico trade.73  Its geographic proximity to the center of 
the Untied States, and its rail and roadway infrastructure have made the Port of Laredo 
one of the fastest growing ports in the United States.  The North American Free Trade 
Agreement has not only increased trade between Mexico and the Untied States, but it has 
also significantly increased trade between Mexico and Canada.  Laredo’s connection to 
U.S. Interstate I-35 plays a critical role in linking the flow of goods between the Laredo 
Bridges and all three countries. 
A. THE LAREDO BRIDGES 
The City of Laredo, Texas operates four international bridges that span the Rio 
Grand.  The bridges are the critical tie that links Laredo’s economy with its sister city, 
Nuevo Laredo.  The first modern bridge linking these two cities was built around the turn 
of the 19th century.  Today, two of the four bridges are dedicated to supporting 
pedestrians and private automobile traffic.  A third bridge services a combination of 
pedestrians, private automobiles, and some commercial vehicles.  The newest of the 
bridges, World Trade International Bridge, services only commercial vehicles.  Bridge IV 
was completed in April of 2000 and supports approximately 2.5 million commercial 
trucks each year.74 Prior to the construction of Bridge IV, it was common for traffic to 
back up on both sides of the border for more than four miles as vehicles waited to cross 
                                                 
72 U.S. Census Bureau Foreign Trade Division, “Foreign Trade Statistics,” 
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top0803cm.html#imports (accessed 
September 20, 2008.) 
73 Laredo Development Foundation Economic Indicators, “Port of Laredo Facts,” 
Http://www.ldfonline.org/products.asp?cat=66&hierarchy=0 (accessed October 27, 2008). 
74 “World Trade Bridge,” Texas Department of Transportation, 
Http://www.dot.state.tx.us/services/transportation_planning_and_programming/border_cr (accessed 
October 27, 2008). 
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the Laredo Bridges.  According to the Texas Department of Transportation, the 
construction of Bridge IV has greatly reduced commercial traffic congestion in 
downtown Laredo and on I-35.   
Rafael Garcia, bridge director for the World Trade Bridge, states that, “more than 
90% of the truck traffic in Laredo flows through Bridge IV.  An additional 6% to 7% is 
handled at the Camino Columbia Bridge (Bridge III).”75  The remaining 3% to 4% of 
commercial vehicle traffic is handled by Bridge I and II.  The traffic from Bridge I and II 
is not considered in this study because the commercial vehicles on these bridges are 
passenger busses that do not carry imports across the border.  There is another bridge in 
Laredo that carries international trade, the Texas Mexican Railway International Bridge.  
This bridge supports the passage of more than 1,200 rail cars each day.  The impact of the 
HSAS on the Texas Mexican Railway International Bridge is not addressed by this study. 
Unlike the Ambassador Bridge, the World Trade Bridge does not operate 24 
hours a day or support a just-in-time delivery system.  Bridges III and IV are open to 
commercial traffic from 7:00AM until midnight Monday through Friday, 8:00AM until 
4:00PM on Saturday, and 10:00AM until 2:00PM on Sundays.  According to Mr. Daniel 
Hastings Jr., a Laredo Import/Export customs broker with 65 years experience, “the main 
flow of cargo across Bridge IV happens each day between 11:00AM and 5:00PM.”76  
The flow of goods across the United States Southern border is also subject to both 
countries’ national holidays. Each year, there are 30 border holidays, 10 U.S. and 20 
Mexican national holidays, of which only two are celebrated on the same day.  Mr. 
Hastings stated that the months of November and May have the fewest workdays, and 
provide a challenge for import/export brokers moving goods across the border.77  
Laredo’s commercial transportation system is unique.  A “drop and hook up” 
drayage operation has developed on the southern border due to U.S.-Mexico trade 
                                                 
75 Mike Hall, “National Report Lists Laredo as Largest Inland Port,” Laredo Morning Times, 
Https://madmax.lmtonline.com/askus/transportation/stories/trans1.htm (accessed October 27, 2008). 




procedures.  Mexico has a pre-arrival system that requires all cargo to be cleared and all 
fees to be paid prior to cargo entering the country.  In contrast, Canada has a post arrival 
system that allows cargo to enter the country and paper work and fees to be completed 
afterwards.  The United States and Mexico do not currently have a bilateral agreement 
that accepts each other countries’ bill of lading.  The lack of a bilateral convention and 
the pre arrival system results in more inefficiency and a decrease in productivity.  Mr. 
Hastings explained that it is common for cargo entering Mexico to require a 48-72 hour 
delay before entering the country.78  While U.S. Customs’ paperwork procedures are 
more efficient, Mexican commercial truck drivers are not allowed to operate beyond 25 
miles of the Southern Border.  While it normally takes less than one minute for a truck to 
pass through the U.S. Customs checkpoint, it can take two to four hours waiting in line to 
get to the checkpoint.  Rather than having expensive long haul trucks idling for hours, 
trucking firms drop the trailers on one side of the border and hire a local shuttle service 
company to take the trailers across the border.  The local drayage companies drop off 
trailers on one side and hook up another trailer to take back across the border.  As a 
result, the more expensive U.S. and Mexican long haul trucking companies spend less 
“down” time waiting at the border.  According to Mr. Hastings, it is common for a local 
shuttle service driver to make three or four trips across the border each day.79  This 
process has developed a warehouse industry in Laredo on each side of the border.  The 
warehouses produce a buffer inventory on each side of the border to cope with 
unexpected border delays. 
B. PORT OF LAREDO CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION 
Service Port-Laredo has a full range of cargo processing functions, including 
inspections, entry, collections, and verification.80  The port is responsible for the entry of 
people and cargo at all five of the bridges as well as the Laredo Airport.  Service Port-
                                                 
78 Daniel B. Hastings Jr. of Daniel B. Hastings Inc. Telephone interview with the author on August 4, 
2008. 
79 Ibid. 
80 “Service Port-Laredo,” CBP.gov, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/toolbox/contacts/ports/tx/2304.xml 
(accessed October 29, 2008). 
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Laredo is staffed with more than 800 personnel and has an annual budget in excess of $40 
million.81  CBP commercial operations are conducted 24 hours a day at the airport and 
the railway bridge.  From 2002-2005, CBP commercial operations at Bridges III and IV 
were conducted 16 hours a day with reduced operating hours on the weekends.  In 
January 2009, CBP is planning for Bridge IV to be open continuously on weekdays.   
Since 2000, the World Trade Bridge has been equipped with eight tollbooths to 
clear commercial vehicles into the United States.  According to Mr. Uribe, when the 
bridge opens at 7:00AM on weekdays, five of the tollbooths are manned.  By 8:00AM, all 
eight booths are opened, and a constant stream of traffic keeps all eight booths busy until 
8:00PM.82  Mr. Uribe indicated that CBP is making plans to add seven additional 
tollbooths in 2009 to keep up with the increasing volume of commercial traffic from 
Mexico.  There is room to expand if more are needed in the future. 
CBP officers at Service Port-Laredo are typically assigned to a certain aspect of 
the commercial operations for a minimum of one year at a time.  This gives the officers 
continuity and better allows them to detect slight changes in the flow of imports.  The 
officers at Bridge III and Bridge IV are split into two 8-hour shifts.  Before each shift, 
officers receive a current intelligence briefing, and the HSAS threat level is reviewed.  
1.  Inspections 
CBP officers at Service Port-Laredo officers encounter a wide array of threats 
from the more than 5,000 commercial vehicles that cross the Laredo Bridges each day.  
According to Mr. Uribe, “narcotics continue to be one of the greatest threats on the 
southern border.”83  Marijuana and cocaine are the most prevalent illegal drugs exported 
by a growing Mexican drug cartel.  CBP is also the primary agency responsible for the 
enforcement of agriculture products, trademark and intellectual property rights, human 
trafficking, as well as screening cargo and personal to prevent terrorist acts. 
                                                 
81 Mr. Jose Uribe APD for Trade Service Port-Laredo, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, phone 




The inspection process starts well before the cargo arrives at the border. The 
Trade Act of 2004 requires all cargo manifests to be sent electronically to the POE a 
minimum of one hour prior to a vehicles arrival at the border.  Bridge IV is staffed with a 
Document Analysis Unit, which is an intelligence-targeting cell responsible for reviewing 
cargo manifests, import/export broker information, trucking company information, and 
other data that helps evaluate the level of risk associated with each vehicle.84  The 
Document Analysis Unit coordinates real time with CBP’s regional intelligence facility 
in El Paso that oversees intelligence operations on the Southwest border.  This process is 
part of the layered approach that helps CBP determine which commercial vehicles should 
be more carefully inspected.  Mr. Uribe explained that one of the greatest reasons for 
delays at the border occurs when companies fail to provide this data prior to a truck’s 
arrival.  
The Port of Laredo is equipped with numerous Radiation Portal Monitors (RPM) 
that passively scan 100% of the vehicles that drive over the Laredo Bridges for 
radioactive materials.  Service Port-Laredo has approximately seven mobile and two 
fixed Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) devices capable of X-raying a semi-truck.  Each 
day, between 10-20% (approximately 500 vehicles) of the commercial vehicles are 
scanned using the NII devices.  The Document Analysis Unit plays a large part in 
determining which trucks should receive this additional inspection.  A tailgate inspection 
is conducted on 10-15% of the commercial vehicles to verify the contents of the cargo.  
Lastly, each day approximately 200 commercial vehicles are completely unloaded and 
the cargo thoroughly searched.85  Additionally, canines are used in conjunction with each 
of these search procedures. 
The complete unloading and search of cargo is conducted at a state of the art 
facility located at the World Trade Bridge.  The facility can simultaneously handle the 
inspection of 110 commercial trucks.  On most days, only 55 of the 110 inspection bays 
                                                 
84 Mr. Jose Uribe, APD for Trade Service Port-Laredo, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, phone 
interview with the author, October 29, 2008. 
85 Approximate data on the number and types of searched provided by Mr. Jose Uribe, APD for Trade 
Service Port-Laredo, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, phone interview with the author, October 29, 
2008. 
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are utilized, which indicates the facility has room to expand if needed.  The trucks are 
unloaded and reloaded by contract workers, and small teams of CBP officers conduct 
searches of the cargo after it is spread across the warehouse floor.  This type of inspection 
is the most expensive and labor intensive, but also the most comprehensive. 
2.  Overtime Data 
Between 2002 and 2005, CBP commercial operations at the Laredo Bridges were 
not conducted 24 hours a day.  The flow of commercial goods in Laredo was limited to 
business hours, and reduced duty hours on the weekend.  CBP commercial operations 
normally consisted of two 8-hour shifts during the weekday.  Overtime was authorized if 
CBP employees work longer than eight hours a day or more than 40 hours a week.  
Again, it is extremely difficult to compare daily overtime data from year to year during 
this time frame.  Under the Department of Homeland Security, the total manning and 
budget of Service Port-Laredo drastically increased from 2002 to 2005 with the merger of 
U.S. Customs and the U.S. Border Patrol.  Additionally, seasonal changes in trade and 
fluctuations in the U.S. economy make comparisons between each of the seven periods 
difficult due to a number of constantly changing variables.  For these reasons, this study 
focused on comparing the periods under threat level ORANGE with the same number of 
days previously under threat level YELLOW.  Table 5 depicts the amount of overtime 
paid by Service Port-Laredo during the seven periods of ORANGE between 2002 and 
2005.  Overall, the port experienced nearly a 70% increase in overtime spending during 
periods of ORANGE as compared to the same amount of time prior under YELLOW.86  
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that more officers would be required 
during higher threat levels.  However, the amount of overtime paid during periods two, 
three, and six stand out as anomalies to the rest of the data.  Both period two and period 
three experienced a decrease in overtime spending during ORANGE.  The intelligence 
information related to the changes in the HSAS during these periods would have applied 
to CBP operations in Laredo.  The threat of attacks against soft skin targets and Operation 
                                                 
86 Service Port-Laredo overtime data provided by US Customs & Border Protection Office of Field 
Operations, via Mr. Daniel R. Meyer, CBP HQ Budget Management & Program Analyst, phone and e-mail 
interviews with the author July 22, 2008. 
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Liberty Shield would have involved officers in Laredo.  The amount of cargo crossing the 
Laredo Bridges during the period two and three ORANGE increased relative to the cargo 
during YELLOW.  This study was unable to identify possible explanations for the 
decrease in overtime spending during period two and period three.  The dramatic increase 
in overtime spending during period six did not logically translate to the intelligence that 
caused the HSAS threat level to increase.  It is difficult to draw a connection between the 
financial districts in New York, Washington, D.C., and New Jersey and the increased 
overtime spending in Laredo, Texas.  The increase in overtime spending during period 
six may be related to the seasonal spikes in the marijuana and cocaine trade across the 
southern border.  The ending and beginning of the fiscal year during the ORANGE 
portion of period six may have also impacted the overtime budget.    
     Service Port-Laredo Overtime Data 2002-2005
1)
28 Aug 2002 -- 10 Sep 2002 = 14 days YELLOW 199,005.85$            Terrorist threat info from debriefings of senior
11 Sep 2002 -- 24 Sep 2002 = 14 days ORANGE 203,291.33$            al Qaeda operative / 1 year anniversary of 9/11
% Delta 2.15%
2)
17 Jan 2003 -- 6 Feb 2003 = 21 days YELLOW 243,155.65$            Intel suggesting al Qaeda attacks on apt 
7 Feb 2003 -- 27 Feb 2003 = 21 days ORANGE 158,270.78$            buildings, hotels, other soft skin targets
% Delta -34.91% after Bali and Mombasa bombings during Hajj
3) 
28 Feb 2003 -- 16 Mar 2003 = 17* days YELLOW 204,004.02$            Operation Liberty Shield--Intel indicated al Qaeda 
17 Mar 2003 -- 16 Apr 2003 = 31 days ORANGE 176,932.75$            may attempt to launch attacks on U.S. interests to 
% Delta -13.27% defend Muslims & Iraqi people / Start of OIF
4) 
9 May 2003 -- 19 May 2003 = 11 days YELLOW 83,899.63$              Wake of bombings in Saudi Arabia & Morocco
20 May 2003 -- 30 May 2003 = 11 days ORANGE 109,617.34$            Believed al Qaeda conducting world wide campaign
% Delta 30.65% to attack Westerners / Memorial Day weekend
5)
1 Dec 2003 -- 20 Dec 2003 = 20 days YELLOW 198,890.25$            Increased terrorist communications indicating 
21 Dec 2003 -- 9 Jan 2004 = 20 days ORANGE 246,023.26$            attacks during holiday season and beyond
% Delta 23.70% using aircraft as a weapon
6) 
21 Apr 2004 -- 31 July 2004 = 102 days YELLOW 901,165.76$            Intel indicates that al Qaeda planning attacks on
1 Aug 2004 -- 10 Nov 2004 = 102 days ORANGE 2,174,961.47$         financial institutions in New York, DC, and
% Delta 141.35% New Jersey / ORANGE for financial sector only
7)
31 May 2005 -- 6 July 2005 = 37 days YELLOW 506,946.15$            Terrorist bombings of London subway
7 July 2005 -- 12 Aug 2005 = 37 days ORANGE 902,951.31$            Threat level raised for mass transit sector only 
% Delta 78.12%
YELLOW Total 2002-2005 2,337,067.31$         
ORANGE Total 2002-2005 3,972,048.24$         
Average % Delta 2002-2005 69.96%
* Only 17 days under YELLOW since previous ORANGE.  Numbers reflect the 17 day average x 31.  
Table 5.   Service Port-Laredo Overtime Data  
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C. LAREDO CARGO DATA 
Data regarding the daily transfer of imports across the Laredo Bridges was 
extremely difficult to access.  Most businesses and government agencies responsible for 
recording data on imports combine the information into monthly or quarterly reports.  
Daily fluctuations can be significant and both sectors prefer to use monthly and quarterly 
averages to compare imports from year to year.  As a result, data on specifically how 
many imports enter the United States on a certain day became lost as the data was 
aggregated into monthly and quarterly averages.  The merger of U.S. Customs and U.S. 
Border Patrol within DHS has also made it difficult to obtain daily records between 2002 
and 2005.  The merger resulted in numerous new computer programs for the combined 
operations of CBP and resulted in daily records being discarded and only the monthly 
averages being transferred into the historical records.87 
Mexico Customs officials, the Laredo Development Foundation, and numerous 
import brokers were contacted regarding the daily flow of cargo, but none was able to 
provide daily records on the amount of cargo that entered the United States via the 
Laredo Bridges between 2002 and 2005.  The only agency able to provide daily records 
on commercial vehicles in Laredo was the City of Laredo Bridge Department.  The 
Laredo Bridge Department has detailed records on the number of commercial vehicles 
that paid the required fee to cross the bridges.  The problem with this data is that the City 
of Laredo only collects a fee on vehicles leaving the United States driving into Mexico.  
As a result, the City of Laredo data depicts the daily number of commercial vehicles 
entering Mexico.  The HSAS should not have directly impacted commercial vehicles 
leaving the United States.  However, because of the nature of Laredo’s “drop and hook 
up” shuttle service, the data can be used as an indicator to changes in the flow imports 
across the border.   
                                                 
87 Kathleen McKevitt Director, Strategic Planning CBP Office of Field Operations, phone interviews 
with the author August 2008. 
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     Laredo Southbound Commercial Traffic 2002-2005
    Number of Commercial Vehicles
1)
28 Aug 2002 -- 10 Sep 2002 = 14 days YELLOW 52,598 Terrorist threat info from debriefings of senior
11 Sep 2002 -- 24 Sep 2002 = 14 days ORANGE 52,327 al Qaeda operative / 1 year anniversary of 9/11
% Delta 0.5%  decrease
2)
17 Jan 2003 -- 6 Feb 2003 = 21 days YELLOW 76,461 Intel suggesting al Qaeda attacks on apt 
7 Feb 2003 -- 27 Feb 2003 = 21 days ORANGE 79,266 buildings, hotels, other soft skin targets
% Delta 3.7% increase after Bali and Mombasa bombings during Hajj
3) 
28 Feb 2003 -- 16 Mar 2003 = 17* days YELLOW 109,552 Operation Liberty Shield--Intel indicated al Qaeda 
17 Mar 2003 -- 16 Apr 2003 = 31 days ORANGE 119,290 may attempt to launch attacks on U.S. interests to 
% Delta 8.9% increase defend Muslims & Iraqi people / Start of OIF
4) 
9 May 2003 -- 19 May 2003 = 11 days YELLOW 38,694 Wake of bombings in Saudi Arabia & Morocco
20 May 2003 -- 30 May 2003 = 11 days ORANGE 45,246 Believed al Qaeda conducting world wide campaign
% Delta 16.9% increase to attack Westerners / Memorial Day weekend
5)
1 Dec 2003 -- 20 Dec 2003 = 20 days YELLOW 89,842 Increased terrorist communications indicating 
21 Dec 2003 -- 9 Jan 2004 = 20 days ORANGE 54,765 attacks during holiday season and beyond
% Delta 39.0% decrease using aircraft as a weapon
6) 
21 Apr 2004 -- 31 July 2004 = 102 days YELLOW 401,279 Intel indicates that al Qaeda planning attacks on
1 Aug 2004 -- 10 Nov 2004 = 102 days ORANGE 401,770 financial institutions in New York, DC, and
% Delta 0.1% increase New Jersey / ORANGE for financial sector only
7)
31 May 2005 -- 6 July 2005 = 37 days YELLOW 153,410 Terrorist bombings of London subway
7 July 2005 -- 12 Aug 2005 = 37 days ORANGE 146,866 Threat level raised for mass transit sector only 
% Delta 4.3% decrease
Commercial Vehicles during YELLOW 2002-2005 921,836
Commercial Vehicles during ORANGE 2002-2005 899,530
Average % Delta 2002-2005 2.4% decrease of traffic during ORANGE
* Only 17 days under Yellow since previous Orange.  Numbers reflect the 17 day average x 31.  
Table 6.   Laredo Southbound Commercial Traffic 2002-2005 
CBP trade officers and local import/export brokers both indicated that any 
changes in the Laredo’s southbound commercial traffic would have a direct 
corresponding effect on the number of northbound commercial vehicles that cross the 
Laredo Bridges.  As previously stated, it is common for local shuttle service drivers in 
Laredo to make three to four trips across the border each day.   
The total number of commercial vehicles that transited Bridge III and Bridge IV 
during HASA level threat level ORANGE decreased 2.4% for the seven periods.88  Most 
of the seven periods actually showed a small increase in the volume of commercial 
                                                 
88 Laredo Southbound Commercial Traffic Data provide by Mrs. Yvette Limon, Assistant Director 
City of Laredo Bridge Department, phone and e-mail interviews with the author, August 2008.  
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vehicles during ORANGE.  Similar to the findings at the Ambassador Bridge, the 39% 
decrease in traffic during the period five ORANGE is most likely the result of a decrease 
in trade during the Christmas and New Year Holidays.  If the change in period five data 
were disregarded, then there would have actually been a slight increase in the flow of 
imports during threat level ORANGE. 
The Service Port-Laredo overtime data demonstrates that an increased threat level 
in the HSAS had a direct impact on CBP overtime operations.  In total, an additional $1.6 
million was spent during the 236 days of ORANGE as compared to normal operations 
under YELLOW.  However, the total number of commercial vehicles entering the United 
States across the Laredo Bridges remained relativity unchanged.  The Laredo data 
indicates that the HSAS had a direct impact on CBP, but had little effect on delaying the 
flow of imports into the U.S. economy.   
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V. THE UNITED STATE’S LINK ACROSS THE PACIFIC 
The cities of Los Angeles (LA) and Long Beach (LB) California each operate the 
two largest ports in the United States.  More than 15 million sea containers, otherwise 
known as Twenty-foot Equivalent Units (TEUs), arrive and depart these two ports each 
year.  Together the ports are known as the San Pedro Bay Ports and are the fifth busiest 
port complex in the world.  Approximately, 43% of all the cargo that enters the United 
States arrives through the San Pedro Bay Port.  This port handles more than $380 billion 
worth of goods each year making it of significant importance to both the regional and 
national economy.  Goods that pass through the San Pedro Bay Port complex reach final 
destinations in all 48 of the Continental United States.   
The majority of imports (87.5%) arrive from the Far East.  China is the largest 
supplier of goods to the port accounting for more than 50% of the value of goods, 
followed by Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea.89  Each of the ports is a public agency 
managed and operated by their respective city harbor departments.  There are 14 
terminals, seven on the Los Angeles side and seven on the Long Beach side, which are 
assigned the responsibility of loading and unloading containers.  Independent companies 
that lease the space from the respective city port authority operate the TEU terminals.  
While each port competes against the other for business, they share much of the same 
infrastructure, environmental concerns, and customs and security procedures.90 
A. THE PORT OF LOS ANGELES  
San Pedro Bay traces its history of shipping and international trade back prior to 
the 1800s when Spain and Mexico used the bay as a natural harbor.  In 1907 the Board of 
Harbor Commissioners was created, which marked the official founding of the Port of 
Los Angeles.  In the early 1900s, fishing, canneries, and oil drilling were some of the 
major industries that impacted the port.  During World War II, the port was transformed 
                                                 
89 “Facts & Figures,” The Port of Los Angeles, http://www.portoflosangeles.org/about/facts.asp 
(accessed August 27, 2008). 
90 “FAQs,” Port of Long Beach, http://www.polb.com/about/faqs.asp (accessed August 27, 2008). 
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by the U.S. military to support the war.  The largest of these activities was shipbuilding. 
The shipyards at the Port of Los Angeles were responsible for producing thousands of 
wartime vessels at a record pace.91   
Following the war, the port continued to grow at a slow but steady rate.  In the 
late 1950s, a revolution in the containerized cargo system came to the Port of Los 
Angeles.  Prior to this revolution, “ports received cargo in crates, pallets, and small lots 
of varying sizes and shapes,” which made unloading cargo extremely slow, dangerous, 
and inefficient.  A standardized container that could be sealed and shipped then quickly 
placed on a “railroad car or truck became the critical logistical innovation that propelled 
the Port of Los Angeles to national importance.”92  
Today, the 7,500 acre Port of Los Angeles welcomes more than 2,700 cargo 
vessels each year that deliver more than 8.5 million TEUs making it the United States’ 
busiest port.  In 2007, the Port of Los Angeles was responsible for delivering $58.7 
billion worth of cargo throughout California, but more importantly, handled the 
movement of $240 billion worth of cargo from throughout the United States.93 
B. THE PORT OF LONG BEACH 
The Port of Long Beach is located just to the east of the Port of Los Angeles and 
they share a common boarder.  From aerial imagery or standing in the port, it is difficult 
to determine where one port begins and the other ends.  Individually, Long Beach is the 
U.S.’s second largest port complex, transporting more than 7.3 million TEUs and $140 
billion worth of goods.94 In 2007, more than 5,000 vessels made ports of call to the Long 
Beach Port. 
                                                 




94 “Facts at a Glance,” Port of Long Beach, http://www.polb.com/about/facts.asp (accessed September 
3, 2008). 
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Long Beach is slightly younger than the Port of Los Angeles. It was founded in 
1911 when the State of California granted tidelands to the City of Long Beach.  In 1917, 
the first Board of Harbor Commissioners was formed to oversee operations at the Port of 
Long Beach.  The port’s history through World War II and the container revolution is 
similar to that of the Port of Los Angeles.95  In 1980, Port of Long Beach officials visited 
China following President Carter’s 1979 normalization of relations with the People’s 
Republic.  In 1981, the China Ocean Shipping Company made the “Port of Long Beach 
its first U.S. port of call”, and trade between the two countries has continued to grow.96 
Today, approximately 90% of cargo entering the Port of Long Beach originates 
from East Asia.  China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan constitute the largest exporters 
of goods that arrive at the Port of Long Beach.97  At 3,200 acres of land, the port has 
reached its maximum physical size, and there are no current plans to expand.  However, 
as globalization continues and new shipping and transportation technologies evolve, it is 
clear that the cargo load on the ports will continue to rise.  
C. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION AT LA/LB SEAPORT 
The U.S. Customs and Border Protection Office of Field Operations at the Los 
Angeles/Long Beach Seaport oversees import operations at San Pedro Bay.  While both 
ports are owned by their respective cities, CBP considers the port to be a single entity.  
CBP LA/LB Seaport has a staff of 624 employees assigned to monitoring the flow of 
43% of the foreign cargo that enters the United States each year.  They provide a full 
range of processing functions, including inspections, entry, collections, and 
verification.98  In addition to cargo ships, numerous cruise ships also make ports of call in 
Long Beach.  Processing cargo constitutes the majority of CBP’s workload; however, the 
                                                 
95 “History,” Port of Long Beach, http://www.polb.com/about/history/1900.asp (accessed September 
3, 2008). 
96 Ibid. 
97 “Facts at a Glance,” Port of Long Beach, http://www.polb.com/about/facts.asp (accessed September 
3, 2008). 
98 “Port Information,” Service Port-Los Angeles/Long Beach Seaport, 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/toolbox/contacts/ports/ca/2704.xml (accessed on October 2, 2008). 
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office is also responsible for the entry of cruise ship passengers into the United States.  
Passenger traffic arriving at Los Angeles’ international airports is the responsibility of 
CBP Service Port-Los Angeles International Airport and is not covered in this study. 
CBP operations at LA/LB Seaport are conducted 24 hours a day, seven days a 
week.  Some of CBP’s offices, such as the warehouse inspection facilities, operating 
hours are dependent on the work schedules of the 14 terminal operations companies.  
This requirement limits some of the CBP inspection operations to approximately 18 hours 
a day. 
1. Inspections  
Similar to operations at the Ambassador Bridge and the Laredo Bridges, 
information regarding cargo destined for LA/LB Seaport is analyzed prior to its arrival.  
Since January 2002, the Container Security Initiative (CSI) has been an effort to push 
U.S. port security outward.99  Through partnerships with foreign authorities, high-risk 
containers originating at ports throughout the world are identified prior to being loaded 
on ships destined for the United States.  Currently, CBP has 58 CSI ports operational 
outside the United States, and 24 more foreign administrations have committed to joining 
CSI.100  Today, more than 90% of all containers shipped to the United States originate 
from a CSI port. 
CBP LA/LB Seaport is staffed with an intelligence-targeting cell responsible for 
reviewing and analyzing information on containers destined for San Pedro Bay.  The 
intelligence cell uses computer programs to screen information on each container prior to 
its arrival.  Country of origin, shipper, importer, broker, and manifested cargo (as well as 
other items beyond the classification of this paper) are factored into a matrix to determine 
the level of risk for each container.  Typically, the targeting cell has five to 10 days to 
review information continuously on a container from the time it is loaded in a foreign 
port until it arrives at LA/LB Seaport.  It is common for the LA/LB intelligence cell to 
                                                 
99 “Container Security Initiative,” U.S. Customs and Border Protection Fact Sheet, March 2007. 
100 Ibid. 
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identify 2,700 containers as higher-risk out of the 40,000 plus containers inbound each 
day.101  Of the 2,700 containers identified as higher-risk, the targeting cell requests more 
documentation from foreign ports, importers, shippers, and manufactures regarding the 
cargo.  By the time the cargo is unloaded at San Pedro Bay, the targeting cell has been 
able to narrow the daily number of higher-risk containers to less than 300.   
CBP LA/LB Seaport has two Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) mobile vehicles 
capable of X-raying large containers and scanning through 10 inches of steel.  The NII 
vehicles scan 200-300 containers each day.  Similar to operations at the Ambassador 
Bridge and in Laredo, tailgate inspections can be conducted if the X-rays identify 
suspicious cargo, or a container can be sent directly to one of four inspection warehouses 
to be completely unloaded.  Approximately 150 containers are unloaded and searched by 
the warehouse teams daily.  CBP manning is currently the limiting factor to inspecting 
more containers each day.  Each of the warehouses is physically capable of accepting up 
to 86 containers at a time.  The workforce to unload the containers is contracted by CBP 
to civilian companies. After the cargo is unloaded from a container, CBP agents inspect 
the contents using canines, X-ray machines, chemical and radiation detectors, and by 
opening and visual inspecting boxes.  This process is labor intensive and normally takes 
six hours from the time a container is opened until it is repacked.   
Three of the warehouses are dedicated to Merchandise Exam Teams (MET), 
which focus on trademark infringement, agricultural issues, product safety standards, and 
tariff violations.  During a normal duty day, the three warehouses inspect approximately 
125 containers.  According to Officer Escobar, manager of one of the three warehouses, 
the MET warehouses are capable of surging to approximately 200 containers per day if 
overtime is authorized and 24-hour operations are conducted.102  The fourth warehouse is 
the Anti-Terrorism Contraband Enforcement Team (A-TCET).  This warehouse conducts 
the remaining 25 warehouse inspections each day.  The A-TCET is dedicated to looking 
for suspected drugs, guns, and terrorism related items.  According to Agent Merrick, “on 
                                                 
101 Gabriel Padilla of the Los Angeles CBP Field Office, interview with the author August 29, 2008. 
102 SCBPO Mina Escobar of the CBP LA/LB Seaport Merchandise Exam Team, interview with the 
author August 29, 2008.  
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most days the team inspects between 20-25 containers.  If overtime is authorized we 
could inspect up to 50 containers per day.”103  In total, if the threat levels require, CBP 
LA/LB Seaport can surge to unloading and completely inspecting approximately 250 of 
the 40,000 containers that arrive each day. 
The last inspection done prior to every container leaving the port is a check for 
radiation.  There are 85 fixed Radiation Portal Monitors (RPM) placed at all of the exit 
gates to the port.  Since 2005, 100% of the cargo entering the United States from San 
Pedro Bay has been inspected for radiation.  Similar to operations at the Ambassador 
Bridge, the intelligence targeting cell plays a large role in determining if radiation 
detected by the RPMs is naturally occurring or requires a closer inspection. 
2. Overtime Data 
CBP operations at the LA/LB Seaport are conducted seven days a week, 24 hours 
a day.  For CBP employees, virtually no difference exists between weekday and weekend 
duty.  LA/LB Seaport manning normally allows for eight-hour work shifts and a normal 
workweek of 40 hours.  During certain conditions, longer work shifts or additional man-
hours may be required to meet the demand of inspecting imports and passengers entering 
the port.  Overtime payments at LA/LB Seaport occur anytime an employee works more 
than an eight-hour day or 40 hours a week. 
Using the same methodology, the author was able to determine overtime spending 
during periods of ORANGE compared to periods of YELLOW while keeping as many 
variables as possible constant.  From this information, the author was able to assess how 
the HSAS impacted CBP operations at the LA/LB Seaport.104 
                                                 
103 SCBPO Kevin Merrick of the CBP LA/LB Seaport, interview with the author August 29, 2008. 
104 LA/LB Seaport overtime data provided by US Customs & Border Protection Office of Field 
Operations via Mr. Daniel R. Meyer, CBP HQ Budget Management & Program Analyst, phone and e-mail 
interviews with the author July 22, 2008. 
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     LA/LB Seaport Overtime Data 2002-2005
1)
28 Aug 2002 -- 10 Sep 2002 = 14 days YELLOW 111,304.09$        Terrorist threat info from debriefings of senior
11 Sep 2002 -- 24 Sep 2002 = 14 days ORANGE 127,406.11$        al Qaeda operative / 1 year anniversary of 9/11
% Delta 14.47%
2)
17 Jan 2003 -- 6 Feb 2003 = 21 days YELLOW 88,474.04$          Intel suggesting al Qaeda attacks on apt 
7 Feb 2003 -- 27 Feb 2003 = 21 days ORANGE 51,040.56$          buildings, hotels, other soft skin targets
% Delta -42.31% after Bali and Mombasa bombings during Hajj
3) 
28 Feb 2003 -- 16 Mar 2003 = 17* days YELLOW 123,425.15$        Operation Liberty Shield--Intel indicated al Qaeda 
17 Mar 2003 -- 16 Apr 2003 = 31 days ORANGE 166,528.37$        may attempt to launch attacks on U.S. interests to 
% Delta 34.92% defend Muslims & Iraqi people / Start of OIF
4) 
9 May 2003 -- 19 May 2003 = 11 days YELLOW 46,755.95$          Wake of bombings in Saudi Arabia & Morocco
20 May 2003 -- 30 May 2003 = 11 days ORANGE 40,357.95$          Believed al Qaeda conducting world wide campaign
% Delta -13.68% to attack Westerners / Memorial Day weekend
5)
1 Dec 2003 -- 20 Dec 2003 = 20 days YELLOW 105,980.80$        Increased terrorist communications indicating 
21 Dec 2003 -- 9 Jan 2004 = 20 days ORANGE 122,361.91$        attacks during holiday season and beyond
% Delta 15.46% using aircraft as a weapon
6) 
21 Apr 2004 -- 31 July 2004 = 102 days YELLOW 395,760.76$        Intel indicates that al Qaeda planning attacks on
1 Aug 2004 -- 10 Nov 2004 = 102 days ORANGE 819,844.14$        financial institutions in New York, DC, and
% Delta 107.16% New Jersey / ORANGE for financial sector only
7)
31 May 2005 -- 6 July 2005 = 37 days YELLOW 433,593.81$        Terrorist bombings of London subway
7 July 2005 -- 12 Aug 2005 = 37 days ORANGE 497,212.59$        Threat level raised for mass transit sector only 
% Delta 14.67%
YELLOW Total 2002-2005 1,305,294.60$     
ORANGE Total 2002-2005 1,824,751.63$     
Average % Delta 2002-2005 39.80%
* Only 17 days under YELLOW since previous ORANGE.  Numbers reflect the 17 day average x 31.  
Table 7.   CBP LA/LB Seaport Overtime Data 
Similar to the findings at Service Port-Laredo, the LA/LB Seaport overtime data 
did not correlate directly to increases in the HSAS.  During period two and four, CBP 
overtime spending at the port actually decreased during ORANGE.  Possible explanation 
for the decrease in spending could be linked to the lack of seasonal holidays, and the 
availability of more agents, which would require less overtime.  Another possible 
explanation might be that the higher threat level did not apply to the port, and CBP 
officials chose to reduce manning.  
The most interesting increase in the overtime data occurred during period six as 




linked to the availability of a new fiscal year budget, or seasonal changes in the amount 
of goods imported.  However, the available intelligence data suggest the terrorist threat 
was focused on East Coast financial institutions. 
In total, CBP LA/LB overtime spending during ORANGE increased nearly 40% 
above the overtime spending during YELLOW.  Again, this data indicates the DHS 
policy makers’ decision to adjust the HASA has far reaching effects beyond the specific 
areas intelligence suggested were at risk.  This study assumes that the additional overtime 
spending was the result of changes in the nation’s threat posture.  CBP records detailing 
the exact reason for the increase in overtime spending, the number of inspections 
conducted each day, or the number of agents on duty each day was either not kept on a 
daily basis or is no longer available from CBP’s historical records.105 
D. LA/LB CARGO DATA 
Of the 15 million TEUs that pass through the San Pedro Bay ports each year, it is 
difficult to determine exactly how many enter the U.S. economy on a specific date.  The 
port authorities of Los Angeles and Long Beach track the arrival of cargo by the date a 
ship departs the port.106  Typically, ships at LA/LB Seaport take between five and seven 
days to unload.  TEUs might stay stacked on the docks for days before they are scheduled 
to be picked up by truck or rail.  Using the port authorities’ records to determine how 
much cargo enters the U.S. economy during certain dates becomes very difficult based on 
the relationships between a ship’s departure date and the dates the HSAS threat level 
changed.   
                                                 
105 Kathleen McKevitt Director, Strategic Planning CBP Office of Field Operations, phone interviews 
with the author August 2008.  
106 Curtis Christensen Long Beach port Authority, interview with the Author, August 29, 2008. 
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Long Beach Port Authroity Cargo Data 2002-2005
TEUs
1)
28 Aug 2002 -- 10 Sep 2002 = 14 days YELLOW 93,677 Terrorist threat info from debriefings of senior
11 Sep 2002 -- 24 Sep 2002 = 14 days ORANGE 97,054 al Qaeda operative / 1 year anniversary of 9/11
% Delta 4% increase
2)
17 Jan 2003 -- 6 Feb 2003 = 21 days YELLOW 117,978 Intel suggesting al Qaeda attacks on apt 
7 Feb 2003 -- 27 Feb 2003 = 21 days ORANGE 125,741 buildings, hotels, other soft skin targets
% Delta 7% increase after Bali and Mombasa bombings during Hajj
3) 
28 Feb 2003 -- 16 Mar 2003 = 17* days YELLOW 243,093 Operation Liberty Shield--Intel indicated al Qaeda 
17 Mar 2003 -- 16 Apr 2003 = 31 days ORANGE 213,691 may attempt to launch attacks on U.S. interests to 
% Delta 12% decrease defend Muslims & Iraqi people / Start of OIF
4) 
9 May 2003 -- 19 May 2003 = 11 days YELLOW 75,658 Wake of bombings in Saudi Arabia & Morocco
20 May 2003 -- 30 May 2003 = 11 days ORANGE 66,981 Believed al Qaeda conducting world wide campaign
% Delta 11% decrease to attack Westerners / Memorial Day weekend
5)
1 Dec 2003 -- 20 Dec 2003 = 20 days YELLOW 125,965 Increased terrorist communications indicating 
21 Dec 2003 -- 9 Jan 2004 = 20 days ORANGE 132,664 attacks during holiday season and beyond
% Delta 5% increase using aircraft as a weapon
6) 
21 Apr 2004 -- 31 July 2004 = 102 days YELLOW 863,855 Intel indicates that al Qaeda planning attacks on
1 Aug 2004 -- 10 Nov 2004 = 102 days ORANGE 956,271 financial institutions in New York, DC, and
% Delta 11% increase New Jersey / ORANGE for financial sector only
7)
31 May 2005 -- 6 July 2005 = 37 days YELLOW 339,360 Terrorist bombings of London subway
7 July 2005 -- 12 Aug 2005 = 37 days ORANGE 382,978 Threat level raised for mass transit sector only 
% Delta 13% increase
YELLOW Total 2002-2005 1,749,802
ORANGE Total 2002-2005 1,934,021
Average % Delta 2002-2005 11% increase in ship deliveries during ORANGE
* Only 17 days under YELLOW since previous ORANGE.  Numbers reflect the 17 day average x 31.  
Table 8.   Long Beach Port Authority Cargo Data 
What is clear from the Long Beach Port Authority data is that changes in the HSAS did 
not impact the arrival of cargo ships or the Port of Long Beach docks.  What the data in 
Table 6 does not indicate is how the HSAS impacted CBP’s ability to release containers 
into the U.S. economy. 
Since daily fluctuations in cargo can be significant, most businesses use monthly 
and quarterly averages to compare imports from year to year.  As a result, the number of 
imports that enter the United States on a certain day becomes lost as data is aggregated 
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into monthly and quarterly averages.  The merger of U.S. Customs and U.S. Border 
Patrol within the Department of Homeland Security has also made it difficult to obtain 
daily records between 2002 and 2005.  The merger of new computer programs for the 
combined operations of CBP resulted in daily records being discarded and only the 
monthly averages being transferred into current records.  After significant research with 
each of the port authorities and the Pacific Merchant Shipping Association, this study was 
able to find two port terminal operation companies that had daily cargo data during the 
period of the HSAS.  They both were willing to release their proprietary information. 
          APM Terminal and SSA Marine Gate Moves 2002-2005
Containers
1)
28 Aug 2002 -- 10 Sep 2002 = 14 days YELLOW 59,197 Terrorist threat info from debriefings of senior
11 Sep 2002 -- 24 Sep 2002 = 14 days ORANGE 72,993 al Qaeda operative / 1 year anniversary of 9/11
% Delta 23.3% Increase
2)
17 Jan 2003 -- 6 Feb 2003 = 21 days YELLOW 119,555 Intel suggesting al Qaeda attacks on apt 
7 Feb 2003 -- 27 Feb 2003 = 21 days ORANGE 105,485 buildings, hotels, other soft skin targets
% Delta 11.8% Decrease after Bali and Mombasa bombings during Hajj
3) 
28 Feb 2003 -- 16 Mar 2003 = 17* days YELLOW 149,988 Operation Liberty Shield--Intel indicated al Qaeda 
17 Mar 2003 -- 16 Apr 2003 = 31 days ORANGE 201,986 may attempt to launch attacks on U.S. interests to 
% Delta 34.7% Increase defend Muslims & Iraqi people / Start of OIF
4) 
9 May 2003 -- 19 May 2003 = 11 days YELLOW 81,993 Wake of bombings in Saudi Arabia & Morocco
20 May 2003 -- 30 May 2003 = 11 days ORANGE 85,772 Believed al Qaeda conducting world wide campaign
% Delta 4.6% Increase to attack Westerners / Memorial Day weekend
5)
1 Dec 2003 -- 20 Dec 2003 = 20 days YELLOW 155,157 Increased terrorist communications indicating 
21 Dec 2003 -- 9 Jan 2004 = 20 days ORANGE 126,539 attacks during holiday season and beyond
% Delta 18.4% Decrease using aircraft as a weapon
6) 
21 Apr 2004 -- 31 July 2004 = 102 days YELLOW 450,809 Intel indicates that al Qaeda planning attacks on
1 Aug 2004 -- 10 Nov 2004 = 102 days ORANGE 682,595 financial institutions in New York, DC, and
% Delta 51.4% Increse New Jersey / ORANGE for financial sector only
7)
31 May 2005 -- 6 July 2005 = 37 days YELLOW 269,636 Terrorist bombings of London subway
7 July 2005 -- 12 Aug 2005 = 37 days ORANGE 285,506 Threat level raised for mass transit sector only 
% Delta 5.9% Increase
YELLOW Total 2002-2005 1,286,335
ORANGE Total 2002-2005 1,560,876
Average % Delta 2002-2005 21.3% increase in containers released during ORANGE
* Only 17 days under YELLOW since previous ORANGE.  Numbers reflect the 17 day average x 31.  
Table 9.   San Pedro Bay Gate Moves 2002-2005 
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APM Terminals and SSA Marine were able to provide the daily number of containers 
released, “gate moves,” into the economy dating back to 2002.107  These two terminal 
operators handle approximately 30% of the cargo that enters San Pedro Bay each year.  
Table 7 depicts the relationship between the HSAS periods and the amount of cargo 
released into the economy by APM Terminals and SSA Marine.   
The 18% decrease of cargo during period five is most likely related to the holiday 
season, and the 51% increase of cargo during period six might be attributed to seasonal 
fluctuations in the retail economy and shipping.   
Based on less than 1% of the TEUs arriving at San Pedro Bay being searched via 
a NII or full inspection, it is easy to understand why the HSAS would have limited effect 
on the flow of imports.  If for some reason CBP was required to inspect 5-10% of the 
containers entering San Pedro Bay, then it would be reasonable to expect an impact on 
the flow of goods into the U.S. economy.  
CBP operations at LA/LB Seaport experienced a 40% increase in overtime during 
threat level ORANGE as compared to normal operations under YELLOW.  The direct 
cost to CBP for the 236 days was an additional $520,000 during ORANGE.  The 11% 
increase in shipping deliveries at Long Beach, and the 21% increase in cargo at APM 
Terminal and SSA Marine indicate that elevations in the HSAS had no effect on slowing 
down imports into the U.S. States economy. 
 
 
                                                 
107 APM Terminal gate move data provided by Mr. Jim Flanagan of APM Terminals, October 15, 
2008. SSA Marine gate move data provided by Mr. John Dibernardo of SSA Marine, October 22, 2008. 
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VI. SUMMARY OF DATA AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The majority of literature written on the economic impact of border security has 
indicated that the increased security following the 9/11 attacks have had adverse affects 
on the flow of foreign imports.  The 2003 Taylor and HBL Decision Economics studies 
suggested that delays on the northern borders cost both the United States and Canada tens 
of billions of dollars in lost productivity and jobs each year.108  The 2005 HDR/HLB 
Decision Economics study suggested that the post 9/11 wait times at the San Diego-Baja 
border are costing each country in excess of $6 billion in lost productivity each year.109  
This study found that increased threat levels of the Homeland Security Advisory System 
(HSAS) had a direct economic impact on U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP).  
However, this study found that the HSAS had no impact on the flow of imports into the 
United States during the seven periods of elevated security between 2002 and 2005.   
A. THE DIRECT COST TO U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION 
This study recognizes that the HSAS was not the only factor influencing overtime 
requirements at each of the three ports of entry.  Seasonal shifts in trade, illegal imports, 
and national holidays played a significant part in the availability of CBP officers and the 
manpower requirement to staff the nation’s more than 300 ports of entry.  During 
interviews at each of the three ports, CBP officers indicated that any change in the HSAS 
threat level would affect procedures at their port.  U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
has developed a department-wide checklist for implementing security procedures as the 
HSAS threat level changes.  Officials at each port also indicated that they have tailored 
additional local directives linked to the changes in the threat level of the HSAS.   
                                                 
108 John C. Taylor, Douglas Robideaux and George C. Jackson, The U.S.-Canada Border: Cost 
Impacts, Causes, and Short to Long Term Management Options (n.p.: May 21, 2003) and HLB Decision 
Economics Inc., Regional and National Economic Impact of Increasing Delay and Delay Related Costs at 
the Windsor-Detroit Crossings (n.p.: January 2004). 
109 HDR/HLB Decision Economics Inc., Economic Impacts of Wait Times at the San Diego-Baja 
California Border (n.p.: January 2006). 
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CBP’s financial records indicate that the elevated threat posture of the HSAS 
resulted in significant increases in overtime spending at Detroit, Laredo, and Los 
Angeles/Long Beach.  Overtime spending for the three ports of entry increased by more 
than 50% during the 236 days of ORANGE between 2002 and 2005.  CBP spent an 
additional $2.7 million more in overtime at these three ports than they did during the 
same periods of YELLOW.  These three ports of entry are responsible for more than 50% 
of the cargo that enters the Untied States, but they represent less than 15% of CBP’s 
overtime-eligible workforce.  If the 50% increase in overtime spending was projected 
over CBP’s 15,000 employees who could have been tasked with extended duty hours, 
elevations in the HSAS could have potentially resulted an additional $18.4 million in 
overtime spending across the nation.110 
          CBP Overtime Spending 2002-2005
Detroit Laredo LA/LB Seaport Combined
YELLOW Total 2002-2005 $1,767,700.72 $2,337,067.31 $1,305,294.60 $5,410,062.63
ORANGE Total 2002-2005 $2,384,848.38 $3,972,048.24 $1,824,751.63 $8,181,648.25
Average % Delta 2002-2005 34.91% increase 69.96% increase 39.8% increase 51.23% increase
Additional Overtime for the 2000 employees at the three POE   2,771,585.62$    
Extrapolated for CBP's 15,000 eligible employees at all POE      18,477,237.47$  





Table 10.   CBP Overtime Spending 2002-2005  
The direct impact of an additional $18.4 million in overtime spending to CBP’s budget is 
noteworthy, but not overwhelming.  When broken down on a day-by-day basis, the 
additional $78K of costs per day appears relativity inexpensive for the additional security 
provided at the nation’s borders.  
When analyzing the data from all three ports of entry, the most interesting 
findings related to overtime spending was the dramatic increase during period six.  From 
August to November 2004, overtime spending at all three ports more than doubled during 
                                                 
110 Data on CBP overtime eligible workforce provided by Customs & Border Protection Office of 
Field Operations, via Mr. Daniel R. Meyer, CBP HQ Budget Management & Program Analyst, phone 
interview with the author, November 7, 2008. 
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threat level ORANGE.  Intelligence related to period six suggested al Qaeda was 
targeting financial institutions in New York, New Jersey, and Washington, D.C.111  
Secretary Ridge indicated that the Department of Homeland Security had obtained 
intelligence regarding five buildings in these three cities.  He also indicated financial 
buildings in the Mid West and West Coast did not appear to be as threatened.112  Despite 
the specific focus of the intelligence, overtime spending at Detroit, Laredo, and Los 
Angeles/Long Beach increased 104%.  Additional research should be conducted to 
determine the relationship between the threat posture of the HSAS during period six and 
CBP’s overtime spending.  
By capturing the direct cost the HSAS places on U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection, this study provides critical information to help the Department of Homeland 
Security and the Homeland Security Council address the decision to make changes in the 
HSAS.  This study demonstrates the far-reaching and sometimes unintentional effect a 
policy maker’s decision in Washington may have on an organization’s operations across 
the country.   
B. THE INDIRECT COST TO THE U.S. ECONOMY 
As this study began, it seemed reasonable that as the threat posture at our nation’s 
borders increased, the flow of imports would be reduced due to stricter inspections at the 
border.  After researching and collecting cargo data from Detroit, Laredo, and Los 
Angeles/Long Beach, it is clear that elevations in the HSAS threat level had little impact 
on the daily flow of imports into the United States between 2002 and 2005.  This study 
was able to analyze the daily flow of goods across the borders and determined that the 
total number of imports remained relativity stable (in some cases actually increased) 
during ORANGE.   
 
                                                 
111 “Remarks by Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge Regarding Recent Threat Reports,” U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security Office of Press Secretary, August 1, 2004. 
112 Ibid. 
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Total Commercial Vehicles / TEUs 2002-2005
Detroit Laredo LA/LB Seaport Combined
YELLOW Total 2002-2005 1,041,541 921,836 1,286,335 3,249,712
ORANGE Total 2002-2005 1,043,340 899,530 1,560,876 3,503,746
Average % Delta 2002-2005 0.17% increase in traffic 2.4% decrease in traffic 21.3% increase in TEUs 7.8% increase
 
Table 11.   Total Commercial Vehicles / TEUs 2002-2005 
The necessary data to define the length of time it took each day to move cargo 
across the border during heightened security levels was unable to be captured by this 
study.  For example, the amount of cargo that normally crosses the border under 
YELLOW between 8:00AM and 6:00PM may have taken until 10:00PM during threat 
level ORANGE.  This would have resulted in more indirect costs to the U.S. economy.  
Most of the experts interviewed in this study indicated that increased wait times were 
likely experienced during the elevated threat levels between 2002 and 2005, but data to 
support this belief is unavailable.  
Two hypotheses can be drawn between the relationship linking CBP’s overtime 
data and the flow of imports.  The first hypothesis is that the additional manpower 
provided by more overtime spending resulted in the necessary workforce required to 
accomplish more frequent and more detailed security inspections.  The larger workforce 
was able to keep up with the increased workload experienced during the seven periods of 
higher security. 
The second hypothesis is that the percentage of cargo required to be inspected at 
the three ports of entry is so minuscule that changes in the HSAS do not generate a 
significant requirement to inspect more cargo.  CBP officials at all three ports indicated 
that the total amount of cargo inspected with a Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) or a 
complete search, is less than 2%.  Each of the officers also stressed that any cargo 
considered suspect would not be released into the U.S. economy regardless of what it did 
to wait times or backing up the flow of imports.  This study has determined that no 
adverse effects occurred in the daily flow of imports between 2002 and 2005 related to 
elevations in the HSAS.  The open source intelligence data associated with each of the 
seven periods does not indicate a threat arriving in a container or by commercial truck to 
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the Untied States.  If intelligence indicated more cargo inspections were not necessary, 
then it is possible that increases in the HSAS did not trigger additional cargo inspections.  
One finding of this study is that CBP’s daily NII and full inspections of cargo are 
being conducted close to full capacity at each of the three ports of entry.  CBP officers at 
each port indicated the number of daily inspections could be only slightly increased with 
the use of overtime and 24 hour operations.  CBP operations at the Ambassador Bridge 
and LA/LB Seaport have the capability to increase the daily number inspections of 
commercial vehicles and containers by approximately 50 at each location.  The new CBP 
inspection facility at the World Trade Bridge in Laredo has the ability to inspect 100 
more commercial vehicles fully each day.  With as many as 10,000 commercial vehicles 
and 40,000 TEU’s entering these three ports each day, the capacity to conduct 200 more 
inspections would not keep up with the flow of imports should intelligence indicate more 
cargo needs to be inspected.   
In summary, this study found that the daily flow of cargo into the United States 
remained relativity constant in regard to changes in the Homeland Security Advisory 
System.  CBP’s use of new technologies, such as Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) to 
inspect 100% of cargo entering the United States for radiation, has made great 
improvements in border security without increasing border wait times. CBP has a limited 
ability to inspect a significant percentage of the cargo completely that enters the United 
States, but the intelligence and the threats have not previously indicated that a higher 
percentage of inspections are necessary.  It is likely that increases in the HSAS threat 
level resulted in longer wait times at the border.  Longer wait times would have placed 
additional indirect costs on the transportation sector, and in turn, the U.S. economy.  
However, data to support directly the association between increased border wait times 




C. RECOMMENDATIONS  
1. CBP Overtime Spending 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection should conduct cost benefit analysis studies 
to determine if current manning is adequate to meet the needs at the nation’s borders.  
Even daily overtime spending during threat level YELLOW is significant.  CBP’s annual 
overtime budget exceeds $250 million.  The overtime budgets for each of the three ports 
of entry in conjunction with recommendations received from officials at each of the ports 
indicated more personnel might be needed to keep up with the increasing volume of 
foreign trade and the necessary security procedures.  
2. Commission Border Infrastructure Studies 
Local, state, and federal transportation and commerce officials need to assess the 
current infrastructure at our nation’s borders.  The studies should focus on determining 
future needs and capabilities for the flow of imports.  Redundancy options for choke 
points such as the Ambassador Bridge need to be considered.  The new World Trade 
Bridge appears to have been a success at reducing traffic congestion in Laredo, but 
starting in January the bridge will operate 24-hour a day to better keep up with the flow 
of imports.  The infrastructure study must consider the potential need of inspecting a 
higher percentage of cargo in the future. 
3. CBP Facilities 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection needs to continue investments in efforts to 
increase inspection capability and reduce border wait times.  New tollbooths and 
adequate manning in Detroit and Laredo appears to have been the key to reducing wait 
times.  Additional booths appear to be the most significant means in reducing daily wait 
times during the peak hours of the day.  Additional future warehouse inspections facilities 
in Detroit and LA/LB may be needed to keep up with increases in trade and security 
procedures.  
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4. Improved Technology 
Since 2001, U.S. Customs and Border Protection has made great strides in 
developing new technologies to better secure the borders.  Technology should continue to 
be a priority for the organization.  During interviews with CBP officials, this study 
encountered areas for improvement.  Placing Non-Intrusive Inspection scanners at 
foreign ports would add an extra layer in CBP’s defense.  This action would also provide 
additional time for CBP’s intelligence cells to study images and identify suspect cargo 
prior to its arrival in the United States.  Fixed drive thru NII scanners at LA/LB Seaport 
could possibly increase efficiency of inspections.  A long-term goal of providing passive 
NII on 100% of the cargo, similar to the RPMs, should be considered in CBP future 
plans.  CBP Officials in Laredo indicated that new camera technology would help 
increase security efforts at the Laredo Bridges 
5. Intelligence Fusion 
CBP’s intelligence targeting cells at each of the three locations appear to be a 
useful tool in determining suspect cargo.  However, only the Laredo targeting cell 
coordinated information with an outside agency, the El Paso Intelligence Center.  
Officials at Detroit and LA/LB indicated their targeting cells did not share data with 
local, state, or other federal intelligence fusion centers. DHS and CBP need to ensure that 
efforts at the borders are linked with other local, state, and federal intelligence fusion 
centers. 
6. Maintain Daily Historical Records 
The process of aggregating daily cargo totals by CBP and other U.S. Government 
originations has reduced the ability to track the effects of the Homeland Security 
Advisory System accurately.  In the future, CBP should consider the need to assess the 
daily flow of imports when selecting database storage programs. 
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